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24 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
YaacovHazan ee4d13ab88 Redis 6.2.18 (#13971)
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### Security fixes

* (CVE-2025-21605) An unauthenticated client can cause an unlimited
growth of output buffers
2025-04-23 14:54:21 +03:00
YaacovHazan ffa361256a Redis 6.2.18 2025-04-23 08:14:39 +00:00
YaacovHazan 5e93f9cb9d Limiting output buffer for unauthenticated client (CVE-2025-21605)
For unauthenticated clients the output buffer is limited to prevent
them from abusing it by not reading the replies
2025-04-23 08:13:13 +00:00
debing.sun 98f91fea4e Fix broken freebsd CI 2025-01-15 21:21:32 +08:00
debing.sun 0d6a6dca38 Disable -Wstrict-prototypes warning 2025-01-15 21:21:32 +08:00
Oran Agra 773f141504 Solve issues with active defrag test failing on fast machines (#11598)
We do defrag during AOF loading, but aim to detect fragmentation only
once a second, so this test aims to slow down the AOF loading and mimic
loading of a large file.
On fast machines the sleep, plus the actual work we did was insufficient
making it sleep longer so the test won't fail.

The error we used to get is this one:
Expected 0 > 100000 (context: type eval line 106 cmd {assert {$hits > 100000}} proc ::test)
2025-01-15 21:21:32 +08:00
Binbin 699b6db0fc Fix handshake timeout replication test race (#11773)
Test on x86 + TLS fail with this error:
```
*** [err]: Slave is able to detect timeout during handshake in tests/integration/replication.tcl
Replica is not able to detect timeout
```

The replica logs is:
```

7681:S 05 Jan 2023 00:21:56.635 * Non blocking connect for SYNC fired the event.
7681:S 05 Jan 2023 00:21:56.638 * Master replied to PING, replication can continue...
7681:S 05 Jan 2023 00:21:56.638 * Trying a partial resynchronization (request ef70638885500aad12dd673c68ca1541116a59fe:1).
7681:S 05 Jan 2023 00:22:56.894 # Failed to read response from the server: error:0A000126:SSL routines::unexpected eof while reading
7681:S 05 Jan 2023 00:22:56.894 # Master did not reply to PSYNC, will try later
```

This is another issue that appeared after #11640 was merged. This PR try to fix it.
The idea is to make it stable in `wait_bgsave`, for example, it may wait until the
next psync retry in the following situation: `Master did not reply to PSYNC, will try later`

Other than that, the change will make the test more consistent / predictable since
it'll mean the master is always frozen in the desired state (waiting for repl-diskless-sync-delay
to happen, rather than earlier stages of the handshake).
2025-01-15 21:21:32 +08:00
debing.sun cd2f92d5ca Check user's oom_score_adj write permission for oom-score-adj test (#13111)
`CONFIG SET oom-score-adj handles configuration failures` test failed in
some CI jobs today.
Failed CI: https://github.com/redis/redis/actions/runs/8152519326

Not sure why the github action's docker image perssions have changed,
but the issue is similar to #12887,
where we can't assume the range of oom_score_adj that a user can change.

## Solution:
Modify the way of determining whether the current user has no privileges
or not,
instead of relying on whether the user id is 0 or not.
2025-01-15 21:21:32 +08:00
Vitah Linanddebing.sun ff4ce3ce01 Deprecate ubuntu lunar and macos-12 in workflows (partial #13669)
1. Ubuntu Lunar reached End of Life on January 25, 2024, so upgrade the
ubuntu version to plucky in action `test-ubuntu-jemalloc-fortify` to
pass the daily CI
2. The macOS-12 environment is deprecated so upgrade macos-12 to
macos-13 in daily CI

---------

Co-authored-by: debing.sun <debing.sun@redis.com>
2025-01-15 21:21:32 +08:00
Vitah Linanddebing.sun c652d95ea1 Upgrade action/checkout version and add old-chain CI actions to test gcc4.8 (#13394)
https://github.blog/changelog/2024-03-07-github-actions-all-actions-will-run-on-node20-instead-of-node16-by-default/

Due to GitHub removing support for CentOS 7 in GitHub Actions, all
actions utilizing CentOS 7 need to be upgraded, upgrade the centos
version from `contos:7` to `quay.io/centos/centos:stream9` which is the
official RedHat centos container.

Create some new actions named `old-chain` to verify support for gcc 4.8.

This PR also includes the upgrade of actions/checkout from version 3 to
version 4.

---------

Co-authored-by: debing.sun <debing.sun@redis.com>
2025-01-15 21:21:32 +08:00
YaacovHazan 441001a4e5 Redis 6.2.17
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2025-01-06 14:36:06 +02:00
YaacovHazan ca0a9ab822 Fix LUA garbage collector (CVE-2024-46981)
Reset GC state before closing the lua VM to prevent user data
to be wrongly freed while still might be used on destructor callbacks.
2025-01-06 14:36:06 +02:00
Oran Agra ad950e4c32 Release Redis 6.2.16
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2024-10-02 23:13:48 +03:00
Oran Agra 0e9710d4dd Release Redis 6.2.15 2024-10-02 22:58:33 +03:00
Oran Agra 9317bf6465 Prevent pattern matching abuse (CVE-2024-31228) 2024-10-02 22:58:33 +03:00
Oran Agra 1f7c148be2 Fix lua bit.tohex (CVE-2024-31449)
INT_MIN value must be explicitly checked, and cannot be negated.
2024-10-02 22:58:33 +03:00
Oran Agra 91863dd854 Redis 6.2.14
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2023-10-18 10:43:10 +03:00
Jachin 2f27ebb414 Fix compile on macOS 13 (#12611)
Use the __MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED macro to detect the
macOS system version instead of using MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_6.

From MacOSX14.0.sdk, the default definitions of MAC_OS_X_VERSION_xxx have
been removed in usr/include/AvailabilityMacros.h. It includes AvailabilityVersions.h,
where the following condition must be met:
`#if (!defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && !defined(_XOPEN_SOURCE)) || defined(_DARWIN_C_SOURCE)`
Only then will MAC_OS_X_VERSION_xxx be defined.
However, in the project, _DARWIN_C_SOURCE is not defined, which leads to the
loss of the definition for MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_6.

(cherry picked from commit a2b0701d2c)
2023-10-18 10:43:10 +03:00
sundb 89391e42c8 Skip test for sdsRemoveFreeSpace when mem_allocator is not jemalloc (#11878)
Test `trim on SET with big value` (introduced from #11817) fails under mac m1 with libc mem_allocator.
The reason is that malloc(33000) will allocate 65536 bytes(>42000).
This test still passes under ubuntu with libc mem_allocator.

```
*** [err]: trim on SET with big value in tests/unit/type/string.tcl
Expected [r memory usage key] < 42000 (context: type source line 471 file /Users/iospack/data/redis_fork/tests/unit/type/string.tcl cmd {assert {[r memory usage key] < 42000}} proc ::test)
```

simple test under mac m1 with libc mem_allocator:
```c
void *p = zmalloc(33000);
printf("malloc size: %zu\n", zmalloc_size(p));

# output
malloc size: 65536
```

(cherry picked from commit 3fba3ccd96)
(cherry picked from commit 646069a900)
2023-10-18 10:43:10 +03:00
Yossi Gottlieb 8f30d2a604 Fix issue of listen before chmod on Unix sockets (CVE-2023-45145)
Before this commit, Unix socket setup performed chmod(2) on the socket
file after calling listen(2). Depending on what umask is used, this
could leave the file with the wrong permissions for a short period of
time. As a result, another process could exploit this race condition and
establish a connection that would otherwise not be possible.

We now make sure the socket permissions are set up prior to calling
listen(2).

(cherry picked from commit a11b3bc34a054818f2ac70e50adfc542ca1cba42)
(cherry picked from commit 3ca02a0c541e019d77014424e207123160520cec)
2023-10-18 10:43:10 +03:00
Oran Agra 24c0bf5c5b Redis 6.2.13
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2023-07-10 14:37:59 +03:00
sundb b313fa4166 Fix alpine tests (partial #12035)
This is a partial cherry-pick from Redis 7.2

1) Fixed `ps -p [pid]`  doesn't output `<defunct>` when using procps 4.x causing `replication
  child dies when parent is killed - diskless` test to fail.

(cherry picked from commit 42c8c61813)
(cherry picked from commit 63fc6c87071d12e3577fc383d5a3f25c60423c8e)
2023-07-10 14:37:59 +03:00
sundb f613873de0 Re-enable hash downsize rehashing during fork (partial #12276)
This was introduced by the recent change in #11692 which prevented a
down-sizing rehashing while there is a fork.

## Solution
1. Fix the rehashing code, so that the same as it allows rehashing for up-sizing
  during fork when the ratio is extreme, it will allow it for down-sizing as well.

Co-authored-by: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>

This is a partial cherry pick of:
(cherry picked from commit b00a235186)
(cherry picked from commit d4c37320382edb342292a3e30250d46896a12016)
2023-07-10 14:37:59 +03:00
Oran AgraandYossi Gottlieb 405d14fd44 Lua cjson and cmsgpack integer overflow issues (CVE-2022-24834)
* Fix integer overflows due to using wrong integer size.
* Add assertions / panic when overflow still happens.
* Deletion of dead code to avoid need to maintain it
* Some changes are not because of bugs, but rather paranoia.
* Improve cmsgpack and cjson test coverage.

Co-authored-by: Yossi Gottlieb <yossigo@gmail.com>
2023-07-10 14:37:59 +03:00
27 changed files with 525 additions and 178 deletions
+12 -4
View File
@@ -52,12 +52,20 @@ jobs:
- name: make
run: make REDIS_CFLAGS='-Werror' MALLOC=libc
build-centos7-jemalloc:
build-old-chain-jemalloc:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container: centos:7
container: ubuntu:20.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: make
run: |
yum -y install gcc make
make REDIS_CFLAGS='-Werror'
apt-get update
apt-get install -y gnupg2
echo "deb http://dk.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ xenial main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list
echo "deb http://dk.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ xenial universe" >> /etc/apt/sources.list
apt-key adv --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys 40976EAF437D05B5
apt-key adv --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys 3B4FE6ACC0B21F32
apt-get update
apt-get install -y make gcc-4.8
update-alternatives --install /usr/bin/gcc gcc /usr/bin/gcc-4.8 100
make CC=gcc REDIS_CFLAGS='-Werror'
+41 -26
View File
@@ -175,21 +175,29 @@ jobs:
- name: module api test
run: ./runtest-moduleapi --valgrind --no-latency --verbose --clients 1
test-centos7-jemalloc:
test-old-chain-jemalloc:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.repository == 'redis/redis'
container: centos:7
container: ubuntu:20.04
timeout-minutes: 14400
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: make
run: |
yum -y install gcc make
make
apt-get update
apt-get install -y gnupg2
echo "deb http://dk.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ xenial main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list
echo "deb http://dk.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ xenial universe" >> /etc/apt/sources.list
apt-key adv --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys 40976EAF437D05B5
apt-key adv --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys 3B4FE6ACC0B21F32
apt-get update
apt-get install -y make gcc-4.8
update-alternatives --install /usr/bin/gcc gcc /usr/bin/gcc-4.8 100
make CC=gcc REDIS_CFLAGS='-Werror'
- name: testprep
run: apt-get install -y tcl tcltls tclx
- name: test
run: |
yum -y install which tcl
./runtest --accurate --verbose --dump-logs
run: ./runtest --accurate --verbose --dump-logs
- name: module api test
run: ./runtest-moduleapi --verbose
- name: sentinel tests
@@ -197,22 +205,31 @@ jobs:
- name: cluster tests
run: ./runtest-cluster
test-centos7-tls:
test-old-chain-tls:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.repository == 'redis/redis'
container: centos:7
container: ubuntu:20.04
timeout-minutes: 14400
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: make
run: |
yum -y install centos-release-scl epel-release
yum -y install devtoolset-7 openssl-devel openssl
scl enable devtoolset-7 "make BUILD_TLS=yes"
apt-get update
apt-get install -y gnupg2
echo "deb http://dk.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ xenial main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list
echo "deb http://dk.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ xenial universe" >> /etc/apt/sources.list
apt-key adv --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys 40976EAF437D05B5
apt-key adv --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys 3B4FE6ACC0B21F32
apt-get update
apt-get install -y make gcc-4.8 openssl libssl-dev
update-alternatives --install /usr/bin/gcc gcc /usr/bin/gcc-4.8 100
make CC=gcc BUILD_TLS=yes REDIS_CFLAGS='-Werror'
- name: testprep
run: |
apt-get install -y tcl tcltls tclx
./utils/gen-test-certs.sh
- name: test
run: |
yum -y install tcl tcltls
./utils/gen-test-certs.sh
./runtest --accurate --verbose --tls --dump-logs
./runtest --accurate --verbose --dump-logs
- name: module api test
@@ -247,24 +264,22 @@ jobs:
run: ./runtest-cluster
test-freebsd:
runs-on: macos-12
runs-on: macos-13
if: github.repository == 'redis/redis'
timeout-minutes: 14400
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: test
uses: vmactions/freebsd-vm@v0.3.0
uses: cross-platform-actions/action@v0.22.0
with:
usesh: true
sync: rsync
copyback: false
prepare: pkg install -y bash gmake lang/tcl86
run: >
gmake &&
./runtest --accurate --verbose --no-latency --tags -large-memory --dump-logs &&
MAKE=gmake ./runtest-moduleapi --verbose &&
./runtest-sentinel &&
./runtest-cluster
operating_system: freebsd
environment_variables: MAKE
version: 13.2
shell: bash
run: |
sudo pkg install -y bash gmake lang/tcl86 lang/tclx gcc
gmake
./runtest --single unit/keyspace --single unit/auth --single unit/networking --single unit/protocol
test-alpine-jemalloc:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+69
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,75 @@ CRITICAL: There is a critical bug affecting MOST USERS. Upgrade ASAP.
SECURITY: There are security fixes in the release.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
================================================================================
Redis 6.2.18 Released Wed 23 Apr 2025 12:00:00 IST
================================================================================
Update urgency: `SECURITY`: There are security fixes in the release.
### Security fixes
* (CVE-2025-21605) An unauthenticated client can cause an unlimited growth of output buffers
================================================================================
Redis 6.2.17 Released Mon 6 Jan 2025 12:30:00 IDT
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency SECURITY: See security fixes below.
Security fixes
==============
* (CVE-2024-46981) Lua script commands may lead to remote code execution
================================================================================
Redis 6.2.16 Released Wed 02 Oct 2024 20:17:04 IDT
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency SECURITY: See security fixes below.
Security fixes
==============
* (CVE-2024-31449) Lua library commands may lead to stack overflow and potential RCE.
* (CVE-2024-31228) Potential Denial-of-service due to unbounded pattern matching.
6.2.15 was an erroneous release,
================================================================================
Redis 6.2.14 Released Wed 18 Oct 2023 10:33:40 IDT
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency SECURITY: See security fixes below.
Security fixes
==============
* (CVE-2023-45145) The wrong order of listen(2) and chmod(2) calls creates a
race condition that can be used by another process to bypass desired Unix
socket permissions on startup.
================================================================================
Redis 6.2.13 Released Mon July 10 12:00:00 IDT 2023
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency SECURITY: See security fixes below.
Security Fixes:
* (CVE-2022-24834) A specially crafted Lua script executing in Redis can trigger
a heap overflow in the cjson and cmsgpack libraries, and result in heap
corruption and potentially remote code execution. The problem exists in all
versions of Redis with Lua scripting support, starting from 2.6, and affects
only authenticated and authorized users.
Bug Fixes
=========
* Re-enable downscale rehashing while there is a fork child (#12276)
================================================================================
Redis 6.2.12 Released Mon Apr 17 16:00:00 IST 2023
+7
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
uname_S:= $(shell sh -c 'uname -s 2>/dev/null || echo not')
LUA_COVERAGE?=no
CCCOLOR="\033[34m"
LINKCOLOR="\033[34;1m"
SRCCOLOR="\033[33m"
@@ -71,6 +73,11 @@ endif
LUA_CFLAGS+= -O2 -Wall -DLUA_ANSI -DENABLE_CJSON_GLOBAL -DREDIS_STATIC='' -DLUA_USE_MKSTEMP $(CFLAGS)
LUA_LDFLAGS+= $(LDFLAGS)
ifeq ($(LUA_COVERAGE),yes)
LUA_CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
LUA_LDFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
endif
# lua's Makefile defines AR="ar rcu", which is unusual, and makes it more
# challenging to cross-compile lua (and redis). These defines make it easier
# to fit redis into cross-compilation environments, which typically set AR.
+1
View File
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static int bit_tohex(lua_State *L)
const char *hexdigits = "0123456789abcdef";
char buf[8];
int i;
if (n == INT32_MIN) n = INT32_MIN+1;
if (n < 0) { n = -n; hexdigits = "0123456789ABCDEF"; }
if (n > 8) n = 8;
for (i = (int)n; --i >= 0; ) { buf[i] = hexdigits[b & 15]; b >>= 4; }
+6 -3
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "lua.h"
#include "lauxlib.h"
@@ -141,13 +142,13 @@ typedef struct {
typedef struct {
json_token_type_t type;
int index;
size_t index;
union {
const char *string;
double number;
int boolean;
} value;
int string_len;
size_t string_len;
} json_token_t;
static const char *char2escape[256] = {
@@ -473,6 +474,8 @@ static void json_append_string(lua_State *l, strbuf_t *json, int lindex)
* This buffer is reused constantly for small strings
* If there are any excess pages, they won't be hit anyway.
* This gains ~5% speedup. */
if (len > SIZE_MAX / 6 - 3)
abort(); /* Overflow check */
strbuf_ensure_empty_length(json, len * 6 + 2);
strbuf_append_char_unsafe(json, '\"');
@@ -706,7 +709,7 @@ static int json_encode(lua_State *l)
strbuf_t local_encode_buf;
strbuf_t *encode_buf;
char *json;
int len;
size_t len;
luaL_argcheck(l, lua_gettop(l) == 1, 1, "expected 1 argument");
+17 -14
View File
@@ -117,7 +117,9 @@ mp_buf *mp_buf_new(lua_State *L) {
void mp_buf_append(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, const unsigned char *s, size_t len) {
if (buf->free < len) {
size_t newsize = (buf->len+len)*2;
size_t newsize = buf->len+len;
if (newsize < buf->len || newsize >= SIZE_MAX/2) abort();
newsize *= 2;
buf->b = (unsigned char*)mp_realloc(L, buf->b, buf->len + buf->free, newsize);
buf->free = newsize - buf->len;
@@ -173,7 +175,7 @@ void mp_cur_init(mp_cur *cursor, const unsigned char *s, size_t len) {
void mp_encode_bytes(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, const unsigned char *s, size_t len) {
unsigned char hdr[5];
int hdrlen;
size_t hdrlen;
if (len < 32) {
hdr[0] = 0xa0 | (len&0xff); /* fix raw */
@@ -220,7 +222,7 @@ void mp_encode_double(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, double d) {
void mp_encode_int(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int64_t n) {
unsigned char b[9];
int enclen;
size_t enclen;
if (n >= 0) {
if (n <= 127) {
@@ -290,9 +292,9 @@ void mp_encode_int(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int64_t n) {
mp_buf_append(L,buf,b,enclen);
}
void mp_encode_array(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int64_t n) {
void mp_encode_array(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, uint64_t n) {
unsigned char b[5];
int enclen;
size_t enclen;
if (n <= 15) {
b[0] = 0x90 | (n & 0xf); /* fix array */
@@ -313,7 +315,7 @@ void mp_encode_array(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int64_t n) {
mp_buf_append(L,buf,b,enclen);
}
void mp_encode_map(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int64_t n) {
void mp_encode_map(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, uint64_t n) {
unsigned char b[5];
int enclen;
@@ -790,7 +792,7 @@ void mp_decode_to_lua_type(lua_State *L, mp_cur *c) {
}
}
int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, int limit, int offset) {
int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, lua_Integer limit, lua_Integer offset) {
size_t len;
const char *s;
mp_cur c;
@@ -802,10 +804,10 @@ int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, int limit, int offset) {
if (offset < 0 || limit < 0) /* requesting negative off or lim is invalid */
return luaL_error(L,
"Invalid request to unpack with offset of %d and limit of %d.",
offset, len);
(int) offset, (int) len);
else if (offset > len)
return luaL_error(L,
"Start offset %d greater than input length %d.", offset, len);
"Start offset %d greater than input length %d.", (int) offset, (int) len);
if (decode_all) limit = INT_MAX;
@@ -827,12 +829,13 @@ int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, int limit, int offset) {
/* c->left is the remaining size of the input buffer.
* subtract the entire buffer size from the unprocessed size
* to get our next start offset */
int offset = len - c.left;
size_t new_offset = len - c.left;
if (new_offset > LONG_MAX) abort();
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "in function mp_unpack_full");
/* Return offset -1 when we have have processed the entire buffer. */
lua_pushinteger(L, c.left == 0 ? -1 : offset);
lua_pushinteger(L, c.left == 0 ? -1 : (lua_Integer) new_offset);
/* Results are returned with the arg elements still
* in place. Lua takes care of only returning
* elements above the args for us.
@@ -851,15 +854,15 @@ int mp_unpack(lua_State *L) {
}
int mp_unpack_one(lua_State *L) {
int offset = luaL_optinteger(L, 2, 0);
lua_Integer offset = luaL_optinteger(L, 2, 0);
/* Variable pop because offset may not exist */
lua_pop(L, lua_gettop(L)-1);
return mp_unpack_full(L, 1, offset);
}
int mp_unpack_limit(lua_State *L) {
int limit = luaL_checkinteger(L, 2);
int offset = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 0);
lua_Integer limit = luaL_checkinteger(L, 2);
lua_Integer offset = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 0);
/* Variable pop because offset may not exist */
lua_pop(L, lua_gettop(L)-1);
+28 -81
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "strbuf.h"
@@ -38,22 +39,22 @@ static void die(const char *fmt, ...)
va_end(arg);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
exit(-1);
abort();
}
void strbuf_init(strbuf_t *s, int len)
void strbuf_init(strbuf_t *s, size_t len)
{
int size;
size_t size;
if (len <= 0)
if (!len)
size = STRBUF_DEFAULT_SIZE;
else
size = len + 1; /* \0 terminator */
size = len + 1;
if (size < len)
die("Overflow, len: %zu", len);
s->buf = NULL;
s->size = size;
s->length = 0;
s->increment = STRBUF_DEFAULT_INCREMENT;
s->dynamic = 0;
s->reallocs = 0;
s->debug = 0;
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ void strbuf_init(strbuf_t *s, int len)
strbuf_ensure_null(s);
}
strbuf_t *strbuf_new(int len)
strbuf_t *strbuf_new(size_t len)
{
strbuf_t *s;
@@ -81,20 +82,10 @@ strbuf_t *strbuf_new(int len)
return s;
}
void strbuf_set_increment(strbuf_t *s, int increment)
{
/* Increment > 0: Linear buffer growth rate
* Increment < -1: Exponential buffer growth rate */
if (increment == 0 || increment == -1)
die("BUG: Invalid string increment");
s->increment = increment;
}
static inline void debug_stats(strbuf_t *s)
{
if (s->debug) {
fprintf(stderr, "strbuf(%lx) reallocs: %d, length: %d, size: %d\n",
fprintf(stderr, "strbuf(%lx) reallocs: %d, length: %zd, size: %zd\n",
(long)s, s->reallocs, s->length, s->size);
}
}
@@ -113,7 +104,7 @@ void strbuf_free(strbuf_t *s)
free(s);
}
char *strbuf_free_to_string(strbuf_t *s, int *len)
char *strbuf_free_to_string(strbuf_t *s, size_t *len)
{
char *buf;
@@ -131,57 +122,62 @@ char *strbuf_free_to_string(strbuf_t *s, int *len)
return buf;
}
static int calculate_new_size(strbuf_t *s, int len)
static size_t calculate_new_size(strbuf_t *s, size_t len)
{
int reqsize, newsize;
size_t reqsize, newsize;
if (len <= 0)
die("BUG: Invalid strbuf length requested");
/* Ensure there is room for optional NULL termination */
reqsize = len + 1;
if (reqsize < len)
die("Overflow, len: %zu", len);
/* If the user has requested to shrink the buffer, do it exactly */
if (s->size > reqsize)
return reqsize;
newsize = s->size;
if (s->increment < 0) {
if (reqsize >= SIZE_MAX / 2) {
newsize = reqsize;
} else {
/* Exponential sizing */
while (newsize < reqsize)
newsize *= -s->increment;
} else {
/* Linear sizing */
newsize = ((newsize + s->increment - 1) / s->increment) * s->increment;
newsize *= 2;
}
if (newsize < reqsize)
die("BUG: strbuf length would overflow, len: %zu", len);
return newsize;
}
/* Ensure strbuf can handle a string length bytes long (ignoring NULL
* optional termination). */
void strbuf_resize(strbuf_t *s, int len)
void strbuf_resize(strbuf_t *s, size_t len)
{
int newsize;
size_t newsize;
newsize = calculate_new_size(s, len);
if (s->debug > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "strbuf(%lx) resize: %d => %d\n",
fprintf(stderr, "strbuf(%lx) resize: %zd => %zd\n",
(long)s, s->size, newsize);
}
s->size = newsize;
s->buf = realloc(s->buf, s->size);
if (!s->buf)
die("Out of memory");
die("Out of memory, len: %zu", len);
s->reallocs++;
}
void strbuf_append_string(strbuf_t *s, const char *str)
{
int space, i;
int i;
size_t space;
space = strbuf_empty_length(s);
@@ -197,55 +193,6 @@ void strbuf_append_string(strbuf_t *s, const char *str)
}
}
/* strbuf_append_fmt() should only be used when an upper bound
* is known for the output string. */
void strbuf_append_fmt(strbuf_t *s, int len, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list arg;
int fmt_len;
strbuf_ensure_empty_length(s, len);
va_start(arg, fmt);
fmt_len = vsnprintf(s->buf + s->length, len, fmt, arg);
va_end(arg);
if (fmt_len < 0)
die("BUG: Unable to convert number"); /* This should never happen.. */
s->length += fmt_len;
}
/* strbuf_append_fmt_retry() can be used when the there is no known
* upper bound for the output string. */
void strbuf_append_fmt_retry(strbuf_t *s, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list arg;
int fmt_len, try;
int empty_len;
/* If the first attempt to append fails, resize the buffer appropriately
* and try again */
for (try = 0; ; try++) {
va_start(arg, fmt);
/* Append the new formatted string */
/* fmt_len is the length of the string required, excluding the
* trailing NULL */
empty_len = strbuf_empty_length(s);
/* Add 1 since there is also space to store the terminating NULL. */
fmt_len = vsnprintf(s->buf + s->length, empty_len + 1, fmt, arg);
va_end(arg);
if (fmt_len <= empty_len)
break; /* SUCCESS */
if (try > 0)
die("BUG: length of formatted string changed");
strbuf_resize(s, s->length + fmt_len);
}
s->length += fmt_len;
}
/* vi:ai et sw=4 ts=4:
*/
+19 -27
View File
@@ -27,15 +27,13 @@
/* Size: Total bytes allocated to *buf
* Length: String length, excluding optional NULL terminator.
* Increment: Allocation increments when resizing the string buffer.
* Dynamic: True if created via strbuf_new()
*/
typedef struct {
char *buf;
int size;
int length;
int increment;
size_t size;
size_t length;
int dynamic;
int reallocs;
int debug;
@@ -44,32 +42,26 @@ typedef struct {
#ifndef STRBUF_DEFAULT_SIZE
#define STRBUF_DEFAULT_SIZE 1023
#endif
#ifndef STRBUF_DEFAULT_INCREMENT
#define STRBUF_DEFAULT_INCREMENT -2
#endif
/* Initialise */
extern strbuf_t *strbuf_new(int len);
extern void strbuf_init(strbuf_t *s, int len);
extern void strbuf_set_increment(strbuf_t *s, int increment);
extern strbuf_t *strbuf_new(size_t len);
extern void strbuf_init(strbuf_t *s, size_t len);
/* Release */
extern void strbuf_free(strbuf_t *s);
extern char *strbuf_free_to_string(strbuf_t *s, int *len);
extern char *strbuf_free_to_string(strbuf_t *s, size_t *len);
/* Management */
extern void strbuf_resize(strbuf_t *s, int len);
static int strbuf_empty_length(strbuf_t *s);
static int strbuf_length(strbuf_t *s);
static char *strbuf_string(strbuf_t *s, int *len);
static void strbuf_ensure_empty_length(strbuf_t *s, int len);
extern void strbuf_resize(strbuf_t *s, size_t len);
static size_t strbuf_empty_length(strbuf_t *s);
static size_t strbuf_length(strbuf_t *s);
static char *strbuf_string(strbuf_t *s, size_t *len);
static void strbuf_ensure_empty_length(strbuf_t *s, size_t len);
static char *strbuf_empty_ptr(strbuf_t *s);
static void strbuf_extend_length(strbuf_t *s, int len);
static void strbuf_extend_length(strbuf_t *s, size_t len);
/* Update */
extern void strbuf_append_fmt(strbuf_t *s, int len, const char *fmt, ...);
extern void strbuf_append_fmt_retry(strbuf_t *s, const char *format, ...);
static void strbuf_append_mem(strbuf_t *s, const char *c, int len);
static void strbuf_append_mem(strbuf_t *s, const char *c, size_t len);
extern void strbuf_append_string(strbuf_t *s, const char *str);
static void strbuf_append_char(strbuf_t *s, const char c);
static void strbuf_ensure_null(strbuf_t *s);
@@ -87,12 +79,12 @@ static inline int strbuf_allocated(strbuf_t *s)
/* Return bytes remaining in the string buffer
* Ensure there is space for a NULL terminator. */
static inline int strbuf_empty_length(strbuf_t *s)
static inline size_t strbuf_empty_length(strbuf_t *s)
{
return s->size - s->length - 1;
}
static inline void strbuf_ensure_empty_length(strbuf_t *s, int len)
static inline void strbuf_ensure_empty_length(strbuf_t *s, size_t len)
{
if (len > strbuf_empty_length(s))
strbuf_resize(s, s->length + len);
@@ -103,12 +95,12 @@ static inline char *strbuf_empty_ptr(strbuf_t *s)
return s->buf + s->length;
}
static inline void strbuf_extend_length(strbuf_t *s, int len)
static inline void strbuf_extend_length(strbuf_t *s, size_t len)
{
s->length += len;
}
static inline int strbuf_length(strbuf_t *s)
static inline size_t strbuf_length(strbuf_t *s)
{
return s->length;
}
@@ -124,14 +116,14 @@ static inline void strbuf_append_char_unsafe(strbuf_t *s, const char c)
s->buf[s->length++] = c;
}
static inline void strbuf_append_mem(strbuf_t *s, const char *c, int len)
static inline void strbuf_append_mem(strbuf_t *s, const char *c, size_t len)
{
strbuf_ensure_empty_length(s, len);
memcpy(s->buf + s->length, c, len);
s->length += len;
}
static inline void strbuf_append_mem_unsafe(strbuf_t *s, const char *c, int len)
static inline void strbuf_append_mem_unsafe(strbuf_t *s, const char *c, size_t len)
{
memcpy(s->buf + s->length, c, len);
s->length += len;
@@ -142,7 +134,7 @@ static inline void strbuf_ensure_null(strbuf_t *s)
s->buf[s->length] = 0;
}
static inline char *strbuf_string(strbuf_t *s, int *len)
static inline char *strbuf_string(strbuf_t *s, size_t *len)
{
if (len)
*len = s->length;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ ifneq (,$(findstring FreeBSD,$(uname_S)))
STD+=-Wno-c11-extensions
endif
endif
WARN=-Wall -W -Wno-missing-field-initializers
WARN=-Wall -W -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-strict-prototypes
OPT=$(OPTIMIZATION)
# Detect if the compiler supports C11 _Atomic.
+6 -5
View File
@@ -397,13 +397,16 @@ int anetUnixGenericConnect(char *err, const char *path, int flags)
return s;
}
static int anetListen(char *err, int s, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t len, int backlog) {
static int anetListen(char *err, int s, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t len, int backlog, mode_t perm) {
if (bind(s,sa,len) == -1) {
anetSetError(err, "bind: %s", strerror(errno));
close(s);
return ANET_ERR;
}
if (sa->sa_family == AF_LOCAL && perm)
chmod(((struct sockaddr_un *) sa)->sun_path, perm);
if (listen(s, backlog) == -1) {
anetSetError(err, "listen: %s", strerror(errno));
close(s);
@@ -447,7 +450,7 @@ static int _anetTcpServer(char *err, int port, char *bindaddr, int af, int backl
if (af == AF_INET6 && anetV6Only(err,s) == ANET_ERR) goto error;
if (anetSetReuseAddr(err,s) == ANET_ERR) goto error;
if (anetListen(err,s,p->ai_addr,p->ai_addrlen,backlog) == ANET_ERR) s = ANET_ERR;
if (anetListen(err,s,p->ai_addr,p->ai_addrlen,backlog,0) == ANET_ERR) s = ANET_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (p == NULL) {
@@ -484,10 +487,8 @@ int anetUnixServer(char *err, char *path, mode_t perm, int backlog)
memset(&sa,0,sizeof(sa));
sa.sun_family = AF_LOCAL;
strncpy(sa.sun_path,path,sizeof(sa.sun_path)-1);
if (anetListen(err,s,(struct sockaddr*)&sa,sizeof(sa),backlog) == ANET_ERR)
if (anetListen(err,s,(struct sockaddr*)&sa,sizeof(sa),backlog,perm) == ANET_ERR)
return ANET_ERR;
if (perm)
chmod(sa.sun_path, perm);
return s;
}
+7 -3
View File
@@ -39,8 +39,12 @@
#include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED) && __MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= 1060
#define MAC_OS_10_6_DETECTED
#endif
/* Define redis_fstat to fstat or fstat64() */
#if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_6)
#if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(MAC_OS_10_6_DETECTED)
#define redis_fstat fstat64
#define redis_stat stat64
#else
@@ -79,7 +83,7 @@
#define HAVE_EPOLL 1
#endif
#if (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_6)) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined (__NetBSD__)
#if (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(MAC_OS_10_6_DETECTED)) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined (__NetBSD__)
#define HAVE_KQUEUE 1
#endif
@@ -248,7 +252,7 @@ void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
#include <kernel/OS.h>
#define redis_set_thread_title(name) rename_thread(find_thread(0), name)
#else
#if (defined __APPLE__ && defined(MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_7))
#if (defined __APPLE__ && defined(__MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED) && __MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= 1070)
int pthread_setname_np(const char *name);
#include <pthread.h>
#define redis_set_thread_title(name) pthread_setname_np(name)
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ static void* getAndSetMcontextEip(ucontext_t *uc, void *eip) {
} \
return old_val; \
} while(0)
#if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_6)
#if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(MAC_OS_10_6_DETECTED)
/* OSX < 10.6 */
#if defined(__x86_64__)
GET_SET_RETURN(uc->uc_mcontext->__ss.__rip, eip);
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ static void* getAndSetMcontextEip(ucontext_t *uc, void *eip) {
#else
GET_SET_RETURN(uc->uc_mcontext->__ss.__srr0, eip);
#endif
#elif defined(__APPLE__) && defined(MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_6)
#elif defined(__APPLE__) && defined(MAC_OS_10_6_DETECTED)
/* OSX >= 10.6 */
#if defined(_STRUCT_X86_THREAD_STATE64) && !defined(__i386__)
GET_SET_RETURN(uc->uc_mcontext->__ss.__rip, eip);
@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ void logRegisters(ucontext_t *uc) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING|LL_RAW, "\n------ REGISTERS ------\n");
/* OSX */
#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_6)
#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(MAC_OS_10_6_DETECTED)
/* OSX AMD64 */
#if defined(_STRUCT_X86_THREAD_STATE64) && !defined(__i386__)
serverLog(LL_WARNING,
+7 -2
View File
@@ -210,9 +210,12 @@ int dictTryExpand(dict *d, unsigned long size) {
* work it does would be unbound and the function may block for a long time. */
int dictRehash(dict *d, int n) {
int empty_visits = n*10; /* Max number of empty buckets to visit. */
unsigned long s0 = d->ht[0].size;
unsigned long s1 = d->ht[1].size;
if (dict_can_resize == DICT_RESIZE_FORBID || !dictIsRehashing(d)) return 0;
if (dict_can_resize == DICT_RESIZE_AVOID &&
(d->ht[1].size / d->ht[0].size < dict_force_resize_ratio))
((s1 > s0 && s1 / s0 < dict_force_resize_ratio) ||
(s1 < s0 && s0 / s1 < dict_force_resize_ratio)))
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1108,7 +1111,9 @@ size_t _dictGetStatsHt(char *buf, size_t bufsize, dictht *ht, int tableid) {
if (ht->used == 0) {
return snprintf(buf,bufsize,
"No stats available for empty dictionaries\n");
"Hash table %d stats (%s):\n"
"No stats available for empty dictionaries\n",
tableid, (tableid == 0) ? "main hash table" : "rehashing target");
}
/* Compute stats. */
+5
View File
@@ -3285,6 +3285,11 @@ int checkClientOutputBufferLimits(client *c) {
int soft = 0, hard = 0, class;
unsigned long used_mem = getClientOutputBufferMemoryUsage(c);
/* For unauthenticated clients the output buffer is limited to prevent
* them from abusing it by not reading the replies */
if (used_mem > 1024 && authRequired(c))
return 1;
class = getClientType(c);
/* For the purpose of output buffer limiting, masters are handled
* like normal clients. */
+1
View File
@@ -1467,6 +1467,7 @@ void scriptingRelease(int async) {
else
dictRelease(server.lua_scripts);
server.lua_scripts_mem = 0;
lua_gc(server.lua, LUA_GCCOLLECT, 0);
lua_close(server.lua);
}
+6 -3
View File
@@ -46,8 +46,11 @@
/* Glob-style pattern matching. */
static int stringmatchlen_impl(const char *pattern, int patternLen,
const char *string, int stringLen, int nocase, int *skipLongerMatches)
const char *string, int stringLen, int nocase, int *skipLongerMatches, int nesting)
{
/* Protection against abusive patterns. */
if (nesting > 1000) return 0;
while(patternLen && stringLen) {
switch(pattern[0]) {
case '*':
@@ -59,7 +62,7 @@ static int stringmatchlen_impl(const char *pattern, int patternLen,
return 1; /* match */
while(stringLen) {
if (stringmatchlen_impl(pattern+1, patternLen-1,
string, stringLen, nocase, skipLongerMatches))
string, stringLen, nocase, skipLongerMatches, nesting+1))
return 1; /* match */
if (*skipLongerMatches)
return 0; /* no match */
@@ -181,7 +184,7 @@ static int stringmatchlen_impl(const char *pattern, int patternLen,
int stringmatchlen(const char *pattern, int patternLen,
const char *string, int stringLen, int nocase) {
int skipLongerMatches = 0;
return stringmatchlen_impl(pattern,patternLen,string,stringLen,nocase,&skipLongerMatches);
return stringmatchlen_impl(pattern,patternLen,string,stringLen,nocase,&skipLongerMatches,0);
}
int stringmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int nocase) {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
#define REDIS_VERSION "6.2.12"
#define REDIS_VERSION_NUM 0x0006020c
#define REDIS_VERSION "6.2.18"
#define REDIS_VERSION_NUM 0x00060212
+8
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ start_server {tags {"repl network"}} {
}
}
test {Slave enters wait_bgsave} {
wait_for_condition 50 1000 {
[string match *state=wait_bgsave* [$master info replication]]
} else {
fail "Replica does not enter wait_bgsave state"
}
}
# But make the master unable to send
# the periodic newlines to refresh the connection. The slave
# should detect the timeout.
+31 -1
View File
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ proc get_child_pid {idx} {
}
proc process_is_alive pid {
if {[catch {exec ps -p $pid} err]} {
if {[catch {exec ps -p $pid -f} err]} {
return 0
} else {
if {[string match "*<defunct>*" $err]} { return 0 }
@@ -800,3 +800,33 @@ proc wait_for_blocked_clients_count {count {maxtries 100} {delay 10}} {
}
}
proc config_set {param value {options {}}} {
set mayfail 0
foreach option $options {
switch $option {
"mayfail" {
set mayfail 1
}
default {
error "Unknown option $option"
}
}
}
if {[catch {r config set $param $value} err]} {
if {!$mayfail} {
error $err
} else {
if {$::verbose} {
puts "Ignoring CONFIG SET $param $value failure: $err"
}
}
}
}
proc config_get_set {param value {options {}}} {
set config [lindex [r config get $param] 1]
config_set $param $value $options
return $config
}
+18
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,24 @@ start_server {tags {"auth"} overrides {requirepass foobar}} {
assert_match {*unauthenticated bulk length*} $e
$rr close
}
test {For unauthenticated clients output buffer is limited} {
set rr [redis [srv "host"] [srv "port"] 1 $::tls]
$rr SET x 5
catch {[$rr read]} e
assert_match {*NOAUTH Authentication required*} $e
# Fill the output buffer in a loop without reading it and make
# sure the client disconnected.
# Considering the socket eat some of the replies, we are testing
# that such client can't consume more than few MB's.
catch {
for {set j 0} {$j < 1000000} {incr j} {
$rr SET x 5
}
} e
assert_match {I/O error reading reply} $e
}
}
start_server {tags {"auth_binary_password"}} {
+6
View File
@@ -485,4 +485,10 @@ start_server {tags {"keyspace"}} {
r SET aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 1
r KEYS "a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*b"
} {}
test {Regression for pattern matching very long nested loops} {
r flushdb
r SET [string repeat "a" 50000] 1
r KEYS [string repeat "*?" 50000]
} {}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ start_server {tags {"defrag"} overrides {appendonly yes auto-aof-rewrite-percent
if {[r config get activedefrag] eq "activedefrag yes"} {
# reset stats and load the AOF file
r config resetstat
r config set key-load-delay -50 ;# sleep on average 1/50 usec
r config set key-load-delay -25 ;# sleep on average 1/25 usec
r debug loadaof
r config set activedefrag no
# measure hits and misses right after aof loading
+13 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
set system_name [string tolower [exec uname -s]]
set user_id [exec id -u]
if {$system_name eq {linux}} {
start_server {tags {"oom-score-adj"}} {
@@ -47,8 +46,15 @@ if {$system_name eq {linux}} {
}
}
# Determine whether the current user is unprivileged
set original_value [exec cat /proc/self/oom_score_adj]
catch {
set fd [open "/proc/self/oom_score_adj" "w"]
puts $fd -1000
close $fd
} e
# Failed oom-score-adj tests can only run unprivileged
if {$user_id != 0} {
if {[string match "*permission denied*" $e]} {
test {CONFIG SET oom-score-adj handles configuration failures} {
# Bad config
r config set oom-score-adj no
@@ -72,6 +78,11 @@ if {$system_name eq {linux}} {
# Make sure previous values remain
assert {[r config get oom-score-adj-values] == {oom-score-adj-values {0 100 100}}}
}
} else {
# Restore the original oom_score_adj value
set fd [open "/proc/self/oom_score_adj" "w"]
puts $fd $original_value
close $fd
}
}
}
+129
View File
@@ -259,6 +259,66 @@ start_server {tags {"scripting"}} {
} 0
} {a b}
test {EVAL - JSON smoke test} {
r eval {
local some_map = {
s1="Some string",
n1=100,
a1={"Some","String","Array"},
nil1=nil,
b1=true,
b2=false}
local encoded = cjson.encode(some_map)
local decoded = cjson.decode(encoded)
assert(table.concat(some_map) == table.concat(decoded))
cjson.encode_keep_buffer(false)
encoded = cjson.encode(some_map)
decoded = cjson.decode(encoded)
assert(table.concat(some_map) == table.concat(decoded))
-- Table with numeric keys
local table1 = {one="one", [1]="one"}
encoded = cjson.encode(table1)
decoded = cjson.decode(encoded)
assert(decoded["one"] == table1["one"])
assert(decoded["1"] == table1[1])
-- Array
local array1 = {[1]="one", [2]="two"}
encoded = cjson.encode(array1)
decoded = cjson.decode(encoded)
assert(table.concat(array1) == table.concat(decoded))
-- Invalid keys
local invalid_map = {}
invalid_map[false] = "false"
local ok, encoded = pcall(cjson.encode, invalid_map)
assert(ok == false)
-- Max depth
cjson.encode_max_depth(1)
ok, encoded = pcall(cjson.encode, some_map)
assert(ok == false)
cjson.decode_max_depth(1)
ok, decoded = pcall(cjson.decode, '{"obj": {"array": [1,2,3,4]}}')
assert(ok == false)
-- Invalid numbers
ok, encoded = pcall(cjson.encode, {num1=0/0})
assert(ok == false)
cjson.encode_invalid_numbers(true)
ok, encoded = pcall(cjson.encode, {num1=0/0})
assert(ok == true)
-- Restore defaults
cjson.decode_max_depth(1000)
cjson.encode_max_depth(1000)
cjson.encode_invalid_numbers(false)
} 0
}
test {EVAL - cmsgpack can pack double?} {
r eval {local encoded = cmsgpack.pack(0.1)
local h = ""
@@ -279,6 +339,68 @@ start_server {tags {"scripting"}} {
} 0
} {d3ffffff0000000000}
test {EVAL - cmsgpack pack/unpack smoke test} {
r eval {
local str_lt_32 = string.rep("x", 30)
local str_lt_255 = string.rep("x", 250)
local str_lt_65535 = string.rep("x", 65530)
local str_long = string.rep("x", 100000)
local array_lt_15 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
local array_lt_65535 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18}
local array_big = {}
for i=1, 100000 do
array_big[i] = i
end
local map_lt_15 = {a=1, b=2}
local map_big = {}
for i=1, 100000 do
map_big[tostring(i)] = i
end
local some_map = {
s1=str_lt_32,
s2=str_lt_255,
s3=str_lt_65535,
s4=str_long,
d1=0.1,
i1=1,
i2=250,
i3=65530,
i4=100000,
i5=2^40,
i6=-1,
i7=-120,
i8=-32000,
i9=-100000,
i10=-3147483648,
a1=array_lt_15,
a2=array_lt_65535,
a3=array_big,
m1=map_lt_15,
m2=map_big,
b1=false,
b2=true,
n=nil
}
local encoded = cmsgpack.pack(some_map)
local decoded = cmsgpack.unpack(encoded)
assert(table.concat(some_map) == table.concat(decoded))
local offset, decoded_one = cmsgpack.unpack_one(encoded, 0)
assert(table.concat(some_map) == table.concat(decoded_one))
assert(offset == -1)
local encoded_multiple = cmsgpack.pack(str_lt_32, str_lt_255, str_lt_65535, str_long)
local offset, obj = cmsgpack.unpack_limit(encoded_multiple, 1, 0)
assert(obj == str_lt_32)
offset, obj = cmsgpack.unpack_limit(encoded_multiple, 1, offset)
assert(obj == str_lt_255)
offset, obj = cmsgpack.unpack_limit(encoded_multiple, 1, offset)
assert(obj == str_lt_65535)
offset, obj = cmsgpack.unpack_limit(encoded_multiple, 1, offset)
assert(obj == str_long)
assert(offset == -1)
} 0
}
test {EVAL - cmsgpack can pack and unpack circular references?} {
r eval {local a = {x=nil,y=5}
local b = {x=a}
@@ -406,6 +528,12 @@ start_server {tags {"scripting"}} {
set e
} {ERR*Attempt to modify a readonly table*}
test {lua bit.tohex bug} {
set res [r eval {return bit.tohex(65535, -2147483648)} 0]
r ping
set res
} {0000FFFF}
test {Test an example script DECR_IF_GT} {
set decr_if_gt {
local current
@@ -449,6 +577,7 @@ start_server {tags {"scripting"}} {
}
test {EVAL does not leak in the Lua stack} {
r script flush ;# reset Lua VM
r set x 0
# Use a non blocking client to speedup the loop.
set rd [redis_deferring_client]
+79
View File
@@ -753,6 +753,85 @@ start_server {
}
}
proc is_rehashing {myset} {
set htstats [r debug HTSTATS-KEY $myset]
return [string match {*rehashing target*} $htstats]
}
proc rem_hash_set_top_N {myset n} {
set cursor 0
set members {}
set enough 0
while 1 {
set res [r sscan $myset $cursor]
set cursor [lindex $res 0]
set k [lindex $res 1]
foreach m $k {
lappend members $m
if {[llength $members] >= $n} {
set enough 1
break
}
}
if {$enough || $cursor == 0} {
break
}
}
r srem $myset {*}$members
}
test "SRANDMEMBER with a dict containing long chain" {
set origin_save [config_get_set save ""]
set origin_max_is [config_get_set set-max-intset-entries 0]
set origin_save_delay [config_get_set rdb-key-save-delay 2147483647]
# 1) Create a hash set with 100000 members.
set members {}
for {set i 0} {$i < 100000} {incr i} {
lappend members [format "m:%d" $i]
}
create_set myset $members
# 2) Wait for the hash set rehashing to finish.
while {[is_rehashing myset]} {
r srandmember myset 100
}
# 3) Turn off the rehashing of this set, and remove the members to 500.
r bgsave
rem_hash_set_top_N myset [expr {[r scard myset] - 500}]
assert_equal [r scard myset] 500
# 4) Kill RDB child process to restart rehashing.
set pid1 [get_child_pid 0]
catch {exec kill -9 $pid1}
waitForBgsave r
# 5) Let the set hash to start rehashing
r spop myset 1
assert [is_rehashing myset]
# 6) Verify that when rdb saving is in progress, rehashing will still be performed (because
# the ratio is extreme) by waiting for it to finish during an active bgsave.
r bgsave
while {[is_rehashing myset]} {
r srandmember myset 1
}
if {$::verbose} {
puts [r debug HTSTATS-KEY myset]
}
set pid1 [get_child_pid 0]
catch {exec kill -9 $pid1}
waitForBgsave r
r config set save $origin_save
r config set set-max-intset-entries $origin_max_is
r config set rdb-key-save-delay $origin_save_delay
r save
} {OK}
proc setup_move {} {
r del myset3 myset4
create_set myset1 {1 a b}
+2
View File
@@ -458,6 +458,7 @@ start_server {tags {"string"}} {
}
}
if {[string match {*jemalloc*} [s mem_allocator]]} {
test {trim on SET with big value} {
# set a big value to trigger increasing the query buf
r set key [string repeat A 100000]
@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ start_server {tags {"string"}} {
# asset the value was trimmed
assert {[r memory usage key] < 42000}; # 42K to count for Jemalloc's additional memory overhead.
}
} ;# if jemalloc
test {Extended SET can detect syntax errors} {
set e {}