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8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Oran Agra 704ba5f5b2 Redis 5.0.14 2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
Oran Agra 6facfb7a10 Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations (CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
  allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
  converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
  listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
  now it'll respond with an error.

(cherry picked from commit 68e221a3f98a427805d31c1760b4cdf37ba810ab)
2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
meir@redislabs.com a4b813d8b8 Fix invalid memory write on lua stack overflow {CVE-2021-32626}
When LUA call our C code, by default, the LUA stack has room for 20
elements. In most cases, this is more than enough but sometimes it's not
and the caller must verify the LUA stack size before he pushes elements.

On 3 places in the code, there was no verification of the LUA stack size.
On specific inputs this missing verification could have lead to invalid
memory write:
1. On 'luaReplyToRedisReply', one might return a nested reply that will
   explode the LUA stack.
2. On 'redisProtocolToLuaType', the Redis reply might be deep enough
   to explode the LUA stack (notice that currently there is no such
   command in Redis that returns such a nested reply, but modules might
   do it)
3. On 'ldbRedis', one might give a command with enough arguments to
   explode the LUA stack (all the arguments will be pushed to the LUA
   stack)

This commit is solving all those 3 issues by calling 'lua_checkstack' and
verify that there is enough room in the LUA stack to push elements. In
case 'lua_checkstack' returns an error (there is not enough room in the
LUA stack and it's not possible to increase the stack), we will do the
following:
1. On 'luaReplyToRedisReply', we will return an error to the user.
2. On 'redisProtocolToLuaType' we will exit with panic (we assume this
   scenario is rare because it can only happen with a module).
3. On 'ldbRedis', we return an error.

(cherry picked from commit d32a3f74f2a343846b50920e95754a955c1a10a9)
2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
meir@redislabs.com f621c0a4cb Fix protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (CVE-2021-32672)
The protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (LUA debugging)
Assumed protocol correctness. This means that if the following
is given:
*1
$100
test
The parser will try to read additional 94 unallocated bytes after
the client buffer.
This commit fixes this issue by validating that there are actually enough
bytes to read. It also limits the amount of data that can be sent by
the debugger client to 1M so the client will not be able to explode
the memory.

(cherry picked from commit 4f95e6809902665ced50646107d174dd8137bcaa)
2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
Oran Agra 71be97294a Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of memory (CVE-2021-32675)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)

(cherry picked from commit 3d221e81f3b680543e34942579af190b049ff283)
2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
Oran Agra 34f447f12c Fix redis-cli / redis-sential overflow on some platforms (CVE-2021-32762)
The redis-cli command line tool and redis-sentinel service may be vulnerable
to integer overflow when parsing specially crafted large multi-bulk network
replies. This is a result of a vulnerability in the underlying hiredis
library which does not perform an overflow check before calling the calloc()
heap allocation function.

This issue only impacts systems with heap allocators that do not perform their
own overflow checks. Most modern systems do and are therefore not likely to
be affected. Furthermore, by default redis-sentinel uses the jemalloc allocator
which is also not vulnerable.

(cherry picked from commit dbb5d95046e6a415fbd32c721c56e9ea32632898)
2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
Oran Agra c043ba77cf Fix Integer overflow issue with intsets (CVE-2021-32687)
The vulnerability involves changing the default set-max-intset-entries
configuration parameter to a very large value and constructing specially
crafted commands to manipulate sets

(cherry picked from commit 4cb7075edaaf0584c74eb080d838ca8f56c190e3)
2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
YiyuanGUO 2b0ac7427b Fix integer overflow in _sdsMakeRoomFor (CVE-2021-41099) 2021-10-04 13:58:43 +03:00
24 changed files with 496 additions and 59 deletions
+30
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,36 @@ CRITICAL: There is a critical bug affecting MOST USERS. Upgrade ASAP.
SECURITY: There are security fixes in the release.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
================================================================================
Redis 5.0.14 Released Mon Oct 4 12:00:00 IDT 2021
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency: SECURITY, contains fixes to security issues.
Security Fixes:
* (CVE-2021-41099) Integer to heap buffer overflow handling certain string
commands and network payloads, when proto-max-bulk-len is manually configured
to a non-default, very large value [reported by yiyuaner].
* (CVE-2021-32762) Integer to heap buffer overflow issue in redis-cli and
redis-sentinel parsing large multi-bulk replies on some older and less common
platforms [reported by Microsoft Vulnerability Research].
* (CVE-2021-32687) Integer to heap buffer overflow with intsets, when
set-max-intset-entries is manually configured to a non-default, very large
value [reported by Pawel Wieczorkiewicz, AWS].
* (CVE-2021-32675) Denial Of Service when processing RESP request payloads with
a large number of elements on many connections.
* (CVE-2021-32672) Random heap reading issue with Lua Debugger [reported by
Meir Shpilraien].
* (CVE-2021-32628) Integer to heap buffer overflow handling ziplist-encoded
data types, when configuring a large, non-default value for
hash-max-ziplist-entries, hash-max-ziplist-value, zset-max-ziplist-entries
or zset-max-ziplist-value [reported by sundb].
* (CVE-2021-32627) Integer to heap buffer overflow issue with streams, when
configuring a non-default, large value for proto-max-bulk-len and
client-query-buffer-limit [reported by sundb].
* (CVE-2021-32626) Specially crafted Lua scripts may result with Heap buffer
overflow [reported by Meir Shpilraien].
================================================================================
Redis 5.0.13 Released Wed Jul 21 16:32:19 IDT 2021
================================================================================
+1
View File
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ static void *createArrayObject(const redisReadTask *task, int elements) {
return NULL;
if (elements > 0) {
if (SIZE_MAX / sizeof(redisReply*) < elements) return NULL; /* Don't overflow */
r->element = calloc(elements,sizeof(redisReply*));
if (r->element == NULL) {
freeReplyObject(r);
+14
View File
@@ -302,6 +302,20 @@ static void test_reply_reader(void) {
strncasecmp(reader->errstr,"No support for",14) == 0);
redisReaderFree(reader);
test("Multi-bulk never overflows regardless of maxelements: ");
size_t bad_mbulk_len = (SIZE_MAX / sizeof(void *)) + 3;
char bad_mbulk_reply[100];
snprintf(bad_mbulk_reply, sizeof(bad_mbulk_reply), "*%llu\r\n+asdf\r\n",
(unsigned long long) bad_mbulk_len);
reader = redisReaderCreate();
reader->maxelements = 0; /* Don't rely on default limit */
redisReaderFeed(reader, bad_mbulk_reply, strlen(bad_mbulk_reply));
ret = redisReaderGetReply(reader,&reply);
test_cond(ret == REDIS_ERR && strcasecmp(reader->errstr, "Out of memory") == 0);
freeReplyObject(reply);
redisReaderFree(reader);
test("Works with NULL functions for reply: ");
reader = redisReaderCreate();
reader->fn = NULL;
+3 -2
View File
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ void georadiusGeneric(client *c, int flags) {
robj *zobj;
zset *zs;
int i;
size_t maxelelen = 0;
size_t maxelelen = 0, totelelen = 0;
if (returned_items) {
zobj = createZsetObject();
@@ -650,13 +650,14 @@ void georadiusGeneric(client *c, int flags) {
size_t elelen = sdslen(gp->member);
if (maxelelen < elelen) maxelelen = elelen;
totelelen += elelen;
znode = zslInsert(zs->zsl,score,gp->member);
serverAssert(dictAdd(zs->dict,gp->member,&znode->score) == DICT_OK);
gp->member = NULL;
}
if (returned_items) {
zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(zobj,maxelelen);
zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(zobj,maxelelen,totelelen);
setKey(c->db,storekey,zobj);
decrRefCount(zobj);
notifyKeyspaceEvent(NOTIFY_ZSET,"georadiusstore",storekey,
+3 -1
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include "intset.h"
#include "zmalloc.h"
#include "endianconv.h"
#include "redisassert.h"
/* Note that these encodings are ordered, so:
* INTSET_ENC_INT16 < INTSET_ENC_INT32 < INTSET_ENC_INT64. */
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ intset *intsetNew(void) {
/* Resize the intset */
static intset *intsetResize(intset *is, uint32_t len) {
uint32_t size = len*intrev32ifbe(is->encoding);
uint64_t size = (uint64_t)len*intrev32ifbe(is->encoding);
assert(size <= SIZE_MAX - sizeof(intset));
is = zrealloc(is,sizeof(intset)+size);
return is;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int lpEncodeGetType(unsigned char *ele, uint32_t size, unsigned char *intenc, ui
} else {
if (size < 64) *enclen = 1+size;
else if (size < 4096) *enclen = 2+size;
else *enclen = 5+size;
else *enclen = 5+(uint64_t)size;
return LP_ENCODING_STRING;
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -1309,6 +1309,10 @@ int processMultibulkBuffer(client *c) {
addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid multibulk length");
setProtocolError("invalid mbulk count",c);
return C_ERR;
} else if (ll > 10 && server.requirepass && !c->authenticated) {
addReplyError(c, "Protocol error: unauthenticated multibulk length");
setProtocolError("unauth mbulk count", c);
return C_ERR;
}
c->qb_pos = (newline-c->querybuf)+2;
@@ -1354,6 +1358,10 @@ int processMultibulkBuffer(client *c) {
addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid bulk length");
setProtocolError("invalid bulk length",c);
return C_ERR;
} else if (ll > 16384 && server.requirepass && !c->authenticated) {
addReplyError(c, "Protocol error: unauthenticated bulk length");
setProtocolError("unauth bulk length", c);
return C_ERR;
}
c->qb_pos = newline-c->querybuf+2;
+15 -2
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
*/
#include <string.h> /* for memcpy */
#include "redisassert.h"
#include "quicklist.h"
#include "zmalloc.h"
#include "ziplist.h"
@@ -43,11 +44,16 @@
#define REDIS_STATIC static
#endif
/* Optimization levels for size-based filling */
/* Optimization levels for size-based filling.
* Note that the largest possible limit is 16k, so even if each record takes
* just one byte, it still won't overflow the 16 bit count field. */
static const size_t optimization_level[] = {4096, 8192, 16384, 32768, 65536};
/* Maximum size in bytes of any multi-element ziplist.
* Larger values will live in their own isolated ziplists. */
* Larger values will live in their own isolated ziplists.
* This is used only if we're limited by record count. when we're limited by
* size, the maximum limit is bigger, but still safe.
* 8k is a recommended / default size limit */
#define SIZE_SAFETY_LIMIT 8192
/* Minimum ziplist size in bytes for attempting compression. */
@@ -441,6 +447,8 @@ REDIS_STATIC int _quicklistNodeAllowInsert(const quicklistNode *node,
unsigned int new_sz = node->sz + sz + ziplist_overhead;
if (likely(_quicklistNodeSizeMeetsOptimizationRequirement(new_sz, fill)))
return 1;
/* when we return 1 above we know that the limit is a size limit (which is
* safe, see comments next to optimization_level and SIZE_SAFETY_LIMIT) */
else if (!sizeMeetsSafetyLimit(new_sz))
return 0;
else if ((int)node->count < fill)
@@ -460,6 +468,8 @@ REDIS_STATIC int _quicklistNodeAllowMerge(const quicklistNode *a,
unsigned int merge_sz = a->sz + b->sz - 11;
if (likely(_quicklistNodeSizeMeetsOptimizationRequirement(merge_sz, fill)))
return 1;
/* when we return 1 above we know that the limit is a size limit (which is
* safe, see comments next to optimization_level and SIZE_SAFETY_LIMIT) */
else if (!sizeMeetsSafetyLimit(merge_sz))
return 0;
else if ((int)(a->count + b->count) <= fill)
@@ -479,6 +489,7 @@ REDIS_STATIC int _quicklistNodeAllowMerge(const quicklistNode *a,
* Returns 1 if new head created. */
int quicklistPushHead(quicklist *quicklist, void *value, size_t sz) {
quicklistNode *orig_head = quicklist->head;
assert(sz < UINT32_MAX); /* TODO: add support for quicklist nodes that are sds encoded (not zipped) */
if (likely(
_quicklistNodeAllowInsert(quicklist->head, quicklist->fill, sz))) {
quicklist->head->zl =
@@ -502,6 +513,7 @@ int quicklistPushHead(quicklist *quicklist, void *value, size_t sz) {
* Returns 1 if new tail created. */
int quicklistPushTail(quicklist *quicklist, void *value, size_t sz) {
quicklistNode *orig_tail = quicklist->tail;
assert(sz < UINT32_MAX); /* TODO: add support for quicklist nodes that are sds encoded (not zipped) */
if (likely(
_quicklistNodeAllowInsert(quicklist->tail, quicklist->fill, sz))) {
quicklist->tail->zl =
@@ -835,6 +847,7 @@ REDIS_STATIC void _quicklistInsert(quicklist *quicklist, quicklistEntry *entry,
int fill = quicklist->fill;
quicklistNode *node = entry->node;
quicklistNode *new_node = NULL;
assert(sz < UINT32_MAX); /* TODO: add support for quicklist nodes that are sds encoded (not zipped) */
if (!node) {
/* we have no reference node, so let's create only node in the list */
+27 -13
View File
@@ -1457,7 +1457,9 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, robj *key) {
if ((len = rdbLoadLen(rdb,NULL)) == RDB_LENERR) return NULL;
/* Use a regular set when there are too many entries. */
if (len > server.set_max_intset_entries) {
size_t max_entries = server.set_max_intset_entries;
if (max_entries >= 1<<30) max_entries = 1<<30;
if (len > max_entries) {
o = createSetObject();
/* It's faster to expand the dict to the right size asap in order
* to avoid rehashing */
@@ -1496,7 +1498,7 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, robj *key) {
} else if (rdbtype == RDB_TYPE_ZSET_2 || rdbtype == RDB_TYPE_ZSET) {
/* Read list/set value. */
uint64_t zsetlen;
size_t maxelelen = 0;
size_t maxelelen = 0, totelelen = 0;
zset *zs;
if ((zsetlen = rdbLoadLen(rdb,NULL)) == RDB_LENERR) return NULL;
@@ -1523,6 +1525,7 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, robj *key) {
/* Don't care about integer-encoded strings. */
if (sdslen(sdsele) > maxelelen) maxelelen = sdslen(sdsele);
totelelen += sdslen(sdsele);
znode = zslInsert(zs->zsl,score,sdsele);
dictAdd(zs->dict,sdsele,&znode->score);
@@ -1530,8 +1533,11 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, robj *key) {
/* Convert *after* loading, since sorted sets are not stored ordered. */
if (zsetLength(o) <= server.zset_max_ziplist_entries &&
maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value)
zsetConvert(o,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value &&
ziplistSafeToAdd(NULL, totelelen))
{
zsetConvert(o,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
}
} else if (rdbtype == RDB_TYPE_HASH) {
uint64_t len;
int ret;
@@ -1555,21 +1561,25 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, robj *key) {
if ((value = rdbGenericLoadStringObject(rdb,RDB_LOAD_SDS,NULL))
== NULL) return NULL;
/* Convert to hash table if size threshold is exceeded */
if (sdslen(field) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value ||
sdslen(value) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value ||
!ziplistSafeToAdd(o->ptr, sdslen(field)+sdslen(value)))
{
hashTypeConvert(o, OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
ret = dictAdd((dict*)o->ptr, field, value);
if (ret == DICT_ERR) {
rdbExitReportCorruptRDB("Duplicate hash fields detected");
}
break;
}
/* Add pair to ziplist */
o->ptr = ziplistPush(o->ptr, (unsigned char*)field,
sdslen(field), ZIPLIST_TAIL);
o->ptr = ziplistPush(o->ptr, (unsigned char*)value,
sdslen(value), ZIPLIST_TAIL);
/* Convert to hash table if size threshold is exceeded */
if (sdslen(field) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value ||
sdslen(value) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value)
{
sdsfree(field);
sdsfree(value);
hashTypeConvert(o, OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
break;
}
sdsfree(field);
sdsfree(value);
}
@@ -1638,6 +1648,10 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, robj *key) {
while ((zi = zipmapNext(zi, &fstr, &flen, &vstr, &vlen)) != NULL) {
if (flen > maxlen) maxlen = flen;
if (vlen > maxlen) maxlen = vlen;
if (!ziplistSafeToAdd(zl, (size_t)flen + vlen)) {
rdbExitReportCorruptRDB("Hash zipmap too big (%u)", flen);
}
zl = ziplistPush(zl, fstr, flen, ZIPLIST_TAIL);
zl = ziplistPush(zl, vstr, vlen, ZIPLIST_TAIL);
}
+61 -4
View File
@@ -125,6 +125,16 @@ void sha1hex(char *digest, char *script, size_t len) {
*/
char *redisProtocolToLuaType(lua_State *lua, char* reply) {
if (!lua_checkstack(lua, 5)) {
/*
* Increase the Lua stack if needed, to make sure there is enough room
* to push 5 elements to the stack. On failure, exit with panic.
         * Notice that we need, in the worst case, 5 elements because redisProtocolToLuaType_Aggregate
         * might push 5 elements to the Lua stack.*/
serverPanic("lua stack limit reach when parsing redis.call reply");
}
char *p = reply;
switch(*p) {
@@ -275,6 +285,17 @@ void luaSortArray(lua_State *lua) {
* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
if (!lua_checkstack(lua, 4)) {
/* Increase the Lua stack if needed to make sure there is enough room
* to push 4 elements to the stack. On failure, return error.
         * Notice that we need, in the worst case, 4 elements because returning a map might
* require push 4 elements to the Lua stack.*/
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "reached lua stack limit");
lua_pop(lua,1); // pop the element from the stack
return;
}
int t = lua_type(lua,-1);
switch(t) {
@@ -292,6 +313,9 @@ void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
* Error are returned as a single element table with 'err' field.
* Status replies are returned as single element table with 'ok'
* field. */
/* Handle error reply. */
/* we took care of the stack size on function start */
lua_pushstring(lua,"err");
lua_gettable(lua,-2);
t = lua_type(lua,-1);
@@ -320,6 +344,7 @@ void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
lua_pop(lua,1); /* Discard the 'ok' field value we popped */
while(1) {
/* we took care of the stack size on function start */
lua_pushnumber(lua,j++);
lua_gettable(lua,-2);
t = lua_type(lua,-1);
@@ -1829,7 +1854,8 @@ int ldbDelBreakpoint(int line) {
/* Expect a valid multi-bulk command in the debugging client query buffer.
* On success the command is parsed and returned as an array of SDS strings,
* otherwise NULL is returned and there is to read more buffer. */
sds *ldbReplParseCommand(int *argcp) {
sds *ldbReplParseCommand(int *argcp, char** err) {
static char* protocol_error = "protocol error";
sds *argv = NULL;
int argc = 0;
if (sdslen(ldb.cbuf) == 0) return NULL;
@@ -1846,7 +1872,7 @@ sds *ldbReplParseCommand(int *argcp) {
/* Seek and parse *<count>\r\n. */
p = strchr(p,'*'); if (!p) goto protoerr;
char *plen = p+1; /* Multi bulk len pointer. */
p = strstr(p,"\r\n"); if (!p) goto protoerr;
p = strstr(p,"\r\n"); if (!p) goto keep_reading;
*p = '\0'; p += 2;
*argcp = atoi(plen);
if (*argcp <= 0 || *argcp > 1024) goto protoerr;
@@ -1855,12 +1881,16 @@ sds *ldbReplParseCommand(int *argcp) {
argv = zmalloc(sizeof(sds)*(*argcp));
argc = 0;
while(argc < *argcp) {
// reached the end but there should be more data to read
if (*p == '\0') goto keep_reading;
if (*p != '$') goto protoerr;
plen = p+1; /* Bulk string len pointer. */
p = strstr(p,"\r\n"); if (!p) goto protoerr;
p = strstr(p,"\r\n"); if (!p) goto keep_reading;
*p = '\0'; p += 2;
int slen = atoi(plen); /* Length of this arg. */
if (slen <= 0 || slen > 1024) goto protoerr;
if ((size_t)(p + slen + 2 - copy) > sdslen(copy) ) goto keep_reading;
argv[argc++] = sdsnewlen(p,slen);
p += slen; /* Skip the already parsed argument. */
if (p[0] != '\r' || p[1] != '\n') goto protoerr;
@@ -1870,6 +1900,8 @@ sds *ldbReplParseCommand(int *argcp) {
return argv;
protoerr:
*err = protocol_error;
keep_reading:
sdsfreesplitres(argv,argc);
sdsfree(copy);
return NULL;
@@ -2236,6 +2268,17 @@ void ldbEval(lua_State *lua, sds *argv, int argc) {
void ldbRedis(lua_State *lua, sds *argv, int argc) {
int j, saved_rc = server.lua_replicate_commands;
if (!lua_checkstack(lua, argc + 1)) {
/* Increase the Lua stack if needed to make sure there is enough room
* to push 'argc + 1' elements to the stack. On failure, return error.
         * Notice that we need, in worst case, 'argc + 1' elements because we push all the arguments
         * given by the user (without the first argument) and we also push the 'redis' global table and
         * 'redis.call' function so:
         * (1 (redis table)) + (1 (redis.call function)) + (argc - 1 (all arguments without the first)) = argc + 1*/
ldbLogRedisReply("max lua stack reached");
return;
}
lua_getglobal(lua,"redis");
lua_pushstring(lua,"call");
lua_gettable(lua,-2); /* Stack: redis, redis.call */
@@ -2292,12 +2335,17 @@ void ldbMaxlen(sds *argv, int argc) {
int ldbRepl(lua_State *lua) {
sds *argv;
int argc;
char* err = NULL;
/* We continue processing commands until a command that should return
* to the Lua interpreter is found. */
while(1) {
while((argv = ldbReplParseCommand(&argc)) == NULL) {
while((argv = ldbReplParseCommand(&argc, &err)) == NULL) {
char buf[1024];
if (err) {
lua_pushstring(lua, err);
lua_error(lua);
}
int nread = read(ldb.fd,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (nread <= 0) {
/* Make sure the script runs without user input since the
@@ -2307,6 +2355,15 @@ int ldbRepl(lua_State *lua) {
return C_ERR;
}
ldb.cbuf = sdscatlen(ldb.cbuf,buf,nread);
/* after 1M we will exit with an error
* so that the client will not blow the memory
*/
if (sdslen(ldb.cbuf) > 1<<20) {
sdsfree(ldb.cbuf);
ldb.cbuf = sdsempty();
lua_pushstring(lua, "max client buffer reached");
lua_error(lua);
}
}
/* Flush the old buffer. */
+3 -3
View File
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ void sdsclear(sds s) {
sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
void *sh, *newsh;
size_t avail = sdsavail(s);
size_t len, newlen;
size_t len, newlen, reqlen;
char type, oldtype = s[-1] & SDS_TYPE_MASK;
int hdrlen;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
len = sdslen(s);
sh = (char*)s-sdsHdrSize(oldtype);
newlen = (len+addlen);
reqlen = newlen = (len+addlen);
assert(newlen > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */
if (newlen < SDS_MAX_PREALLOC)
newlen *= 2;
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
if (type == SDS_TYPE_5) type = SDS_TYPE_8;
hdrlen = sdsHdrSize(type);
assert(hdrlen+newlen+1 > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */
assert(hdrlen + newlen + 1 > reqlen); /* Catch size_t overflow */
if (oldtype==type) {
newsh = s_realloc(sh, hdrlen+newlen+1);
if (newsh == NULL) return NULL;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1702,7 +1702,7 @@ unsigned char *zzlFirstInRange(unsigned char *zl, zrangespec *range);
unsigned char *zzlLastInRange(unsigned char *zl, zrangespec *range);
unsigned long zsetLength(const robj *zobj);
void zsetConvert(robj *zobj, int encoding);
void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen);
void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen, size_t totelelen);
int zsetScore(robj *zobj, sds member, double *score);
unsigned long zslGetRank(zskiplist *zsl, double score, sds o);
int zsetAdd(robj *zobj, double score, sds ele, int *flags, double *newscore);
+9 -4
View File
@@ -39,17 +39,22 @@
* as their string length can be queried in constant time. */
void hashTypeTryConversion(robj *o, robj **argv, int start, int end) {
int i;
size_t sum = 0;
if (o->encoding != OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST) return;
for (i = start; i <= end; i++) {
if (sdsEncodedObject(argv[i]) &&
sdslen(argv[i]->ptr) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value)
{
if (!sdsEncodedObject(argv[i]))
continue;
size_t len = sdslen(argv[i]->ptr);
if (len > server.hash_max_ziplist_value) {
hashTypeConvert(o, OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
break;
return;
}
sum += len;
}
if (!ziplistSafeToAdd(o->ptr, sum))
hashTypeConvert(o, OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
}
/* Get the value from a ziplist encoded hash, identified by field.
+25
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
#include "server.h"
#define LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE ((1ull<<32)-1024)
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
* List API
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
@@ -196,6 +198,14 @@ void listTypeConvert(robj *subject, int enc) {
void pushGenericCommand(client *c, int where) {
int j, pushed = 0;
for (j = 2; j < c->argc; j++) {
if (sdslen(c->argv[j]->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
return;
}
}
robj *lobj = lookupKeyWrite(c->db,c->argv[1]);
if (lobj && lobj->type != OBJ_LIST) {
@@ -277,6 +287,11 @@ void linsertCommand(client *c) {
return;
}
if (sdslen(c->argv[4]->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
return;
}
if ((subject = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[1],shared.czero)) == NULL ||
checkType(c,subject,OBJ_LIST)) return;
@@ -344,6 +359,11 @@ void lsetCommand(client *c) {
long index;
robj *value = c->argv[3];
if (sdslen(value->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
return;
}
if ((getLongFromObjectOrReply(c, c->argv[2], &index, NULL) != C_OK))
return;
@@ -493,6 +513,11 @@ void lremCommand(client *c) {
long toremove;
long removed = 0;
if (sdslen(obj->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
return;
}
if ((getLongFromObjectOrReply(c, c->argv[2], &toremove, NULL) != C_OK))
return;
+4 -1
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,10 @@ int setTypeAdd(robj *subject, sds value) {
if (success) {
/* Convert to regular set when the intset contains
* too many entries. */
if (intsetLen(subject->ptr) > server.set_max_intset_entries)
size_t max_entries = server.set_max_intset_entries;
/* limit to 1G entries due to intset internals. */
if (max_entries >= 1<<30) max_entries = 1<<30;
if (intsetLen(subject->ptr) > max_entries)
setTypeConvert(subject,OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
return 1;
}
+38 -10
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
#define STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_DELETED (1<<0) /* Entry is delted. Skip it. */
#define STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_SAMEFIELDS (1<<1) /* Same fields as master entry. */
/* Don't let listpacks grow too big, even if the user config allows it.
* doing so can lead to an overflow (trying to store more than 32bit length
* into the listpack header), or actually an assertion since lpInsert
* will return NULL. */
#define STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE (1<<30)
void streamFreeCG(streamCG *cg);
void streamFreeNACK(streamNACK *na);
size_t streamReplyWithRangeFromConsumerPEL(client *c, stream *s, streamID *start, streamID *end, size_t count, streamConsumer *consumer);
@@ -191,8 +197,11 @@ int streamCompareID(streamID *a, streamID *b) {
*
* The function returns C_OK if the item was added, this is always true
* if the ID was generated by the function. However the function may return
* C_ERR if an ID was given via 'use_id', but adding it failed since the
* current top ID is greater or equal. */
* C_ERR in several cases:
* 1. If an ID was given via 'use_id', but adding it failed since the
* current top ID is greater or equal. errno will be set to EDOM.
* 2. If a size of a single element or the sum of the elements is too big to
* be stored into the stream. errno will be set to ERANGE. */
int streamAppendItem(stream *s, robj **argv, int64_t numfields, streamID *added_id, streamID *use_id) {
/* Generate the new entry ID. */
@@ -206,7 +215,23 @@ int streamAppendItem(stream *s, robj **argv, int64_t numfields, streamID *added_
* or return an error. Automatically generated IDs might
* overflow (and wrap-around) when incrementing the sequence
part. */
if (streamCompareID(&id,&s->last_id) <= 0) return C_ERR;
if (streamCompareID(&id,&s->last_id) <= 0) {
errno = EDOM;
return C_ERR;
}
/* Avoid overflow when trying to add an element to the stream (listpack
* can only host up to 32bit length sttrings, and also a total listpack size
* can't be bigger than 32bit length. */
size_t totelelen = 0;
for (int64_t i = 0; i < numfields*2; i++) {
sds ele = argv[i]->ptr;
totelelen += sdslen(ele);
}
if (totelelen > STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE) {
errno = ERANGE;
return C_ERR;
}
/* Add the new entry. */
raxIterator ri;
@@ -265,9 +290,10 @@ int streamAppendItem(stream *s, robj **argv, int64_t numfields, streamID *added_
* if we need to switch to the next one. 'lp' will be set to NULL if
* the current node is full. */
if (lp != NULL) {
if (server.stream_node_max_bytes &&
lp_bytes >= server.stream_node_max_bytes)
{
size_t node_max_bytes = server.stream_node_max_bytes;
if (node_max_bytes == 0 || node_max_bytes > STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE)
node_max_bytes = STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE;
if (lp_bytes + totelelen >= node_max_bytes) {
lp = NULL;
} else if (server.stream_node_max_entries) {
int64_t count = lpGetInteger(lpFirst(lp));
@@ -1283,11 +1309,13 @@ void xaddCommand(client *c) {
/* Append using the low level function and return the ID. */
if (streamAppendItem(s,c->argv+field_pos,(c->argc-field_pos)/2,
&id, id_given ? &id : NULL)
== C_ERR)
&id, id_given ? &id : NULL) == C_ERR)
{
addReplyError(c,"The ID specified in XADD is equal or smaller than the "
"target stream top item");
if (errno == EDOM)
addReplyError(c,"The ID specified in XADD is equal or smaller than "
"the target stream top item");
else
addReplyError(c,"Elements are too large to be stored");
return;
}
addReplyStreamID(c,&id);
+28 -15
View File
@@ -1237,15 +1237,18 @@ void zsetConvert(robj *zobj, int encoding) {
}
/* Convert the sorted set object into a ziplist if it is not already a ziplist
* and if the number of elements and the maximum element size is within the
* expected ranges. */
void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen) {
* and if the number of elements and the maximum element size and total elements size
* are within the expected ranges. */
void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen, size_t totelelen) {
if (zobj->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST) return;
zset *zset = zobj->ptr;
if (zset->zsl->length <= server.zset_max_ziplist_entries &&
maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value)
zsetConvert(zobj,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value &&
ziplistSafeToAdd(NULL, totelelen))
{
zsetConvert(zobj,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
}
}
/* Return (by reference) the score of the specified member of the sorted set
@@ -1354,20 +1357,28 @@ int zsetAdd(robj *zobj, double score, sds ele, int *flags, double *newscore) {
}
return 1;
} else if (!xx) {
/* Optimize: check if the element is too large or the list
/* check if the element is too large or the list
* becomes too long *before* executing zzlInsert. */
zobj->ptr = zzlInsert(zobj->ptr,ele,score);
if (zzlLength(zobj->ptr) > server.zset_max_ziplist_entries ||
sdslen(ele) > server.zset_max_ziplist_value)
if (zzlLength(zobj->ptr)+1 > server.zset_max_ziplist_entries ||
sdslen(ele) > server.zset_max_ziplist_value ||
!ziplistSafeToAdd(zobj->ptr, sdslen(ele)))
{
zsetConvert(zobj,OBJ_ENCODING_SKIPLIST);
if (newscore) *newscore = score;
*flags |= ZADD_ADDED;
return 1;
} else {
zobj->ptr = zzlInsert(zobj->ptr,ele,score);
if (newscore) *newscore = score;
*flags |= ZADD_ADDED;
return 1;
}
} else {
*flags |= ZADD_NOP;
return 1;
}
} else if (zobj->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_SKIPLIST) {
}
/* Note that the above block handling ziplist would have either returned or
* converted the key to skiplist. */
if (zobj->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_SKIPLIST) {
zset *zs = zobj->ptr;
zskiplistNode *znode;
dictEntry *de;
@@ -2179,7 +2190,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
zsetopsrc *src;
zsetopval zval;
sds tmp;
size_t maxelelen = 0;
size_t maxelelen = 0, totelelen = 0;
robj *dstobj;
zset *dstzset;
zskiplistNode *znode;
@@ -2303,6 +2314,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
tmp = zuiNewSdsFromValue(&zval);
znode = zslInsert(dstzset->zsl,score,tmp);
dictAdd(dstzset->dict,tmp,&znode->score);
totelelen += sdslen(tmp);
if (sdslen(tmp) > maxelelen) maxelelen = sdslen(tmp);
}
}
@@ -2339,6 +2351,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
/* Remember the longest single element encountered,
* to understand if it's possible to convert to ziplist
* at the end. */
totelelen += sdslen(tmp);
if (sdslen(tmp) > maxelelen) maxelelen = sdslen(tmp);
/* Update the element with its initial score. */
dictSetKey(accumulator, de, tmp);
@@ -2379,7 +2392,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
if (dbDelete(c->db,dstkey))
touched = 1;
if (dstzset->zsl->length) {
zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(dstobj,maxelelen);
zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(dstobj,maxelelen,totelelen);
dbAdd(c->db,dstkey,dstobj);
addReplyLongLong(c,zsetLength(dstobj));
signalModifiedKey(c->db,dstkey);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
#define REDIS_VERSION "5.0.13"
#define REDIS_VERSION "5.0.14"
+16 -1
View File
@@ -265,6 +265,17 @@
ZIPLIST_LENGTH(zl) = intrev16ifbe(intrev16ifbe(ZIPLIST_LENGTH(zl))+incr); \
}
/* Don't let ziplists grow over 1GB in any case, don't wanna risk overflow in
* zlbytes*/
#define ZIPLIST_MAX_SAFETY_SIZE (1<<30)
int ziplistSafeToAdd(unsigned char* zl, size_t add) {
size_t len = zl? ziplistBlobLen(zl): 0;
if (len + add > ZIPLIST_MAX_SAFETY_SIZE)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* We use this function to receive information about a ziplist entry.
* Note that this is not how the data is actually encoded, is just what we
* get filled by a function in order to operate more easily. */
@@ -586,7 +597,8 @@ unsigned char *ziplistNew(void) {
}
/* Resize the ziplist. */
unsigned char *ziplistResize(unsigned char *zl, unsigned int len) {
unsigned char *ziplistResize(unsigned char *zl, size_t len) {
assert(len < UINT32_MAX);
zl = zrealloc(zl,len);
ZIPLIST_BYTES(zl) = intrev32ifbe(len);
zl[len-1] = ZIP_END;
@@ -898,6 +910,9 @@ unsigned char *ziplistMerge(unsigned char **first, unsigned char **second) {
/* Combined zl length should be limited within UINT16_MAX */
zllength = zllength < UINT16_MAX ? zllength : UINT16_MAX;
/* larger values can't be stored into ZIPLIST_BYTES */
assert(zlbytes < UINT32_MAX);
/* Save offset positions before we start ripping memory apart. */
size_t first_offset = intrev32ifbe(ZIPLIST_TAIL_OFFSET(*first));
size_t second_offset = intrev32ifbe(ZIPLIST_TAIL_OFFSET(*second));
+1
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ unsigned char *ziplistFind(unsigned char *p, unsigned char *vstr, unsigned int v
unsigned int ziplistLen(unsigned char *zl);
size_t ziplistBlobLen(unsigned char *zl);
void ziplistRepr(unsigned char *zl);
int ziplistSafeToAdd(unsigned char* zl, size_t add);
#ifdef REDIS_TEST
int ziplistTest(int argc, char *argv[]);
+21
View File
@@ -99,6 +99,27 @@ proc wait_for_ofs_sync {r1 r2} {
}
}
# count current log lines in server's stdout
proc count_log_lines {srv_idx} {
set _ [string trim [exec wc -l < [srv $srv_idx stdout]]]
}
# returns the number of times a line with that pattern appears in a file
proc count_message_lines {file pattern} {
set res 0
# exec fails when grep exists with status other than 0 (when the patter wasn't found)
catch {
set res [string trim [exec grep $pattern $file 2> /dev/null | wc -l]]
}
return $res
}
# returns the number of times a line with that pattern appears in the log
proc count_log_message {srv_idx pattern} {
set stdout [srv $srv_idx stdout]
return [count_message_lines $stdout $pattern]
}
# Random integer between 0 and max (excluded).
proc randomInt {max} {
expr {int(rand()*$max)}
+16
View File
@@ -24,4 +24,20 @@ start_server {tags {"auth"} overrides {requirepass foobar}} {
r set foo 100
r incr foo
} {101}
test {For unauthenticated clients multibulk and bulk length are limited} {
set rr [redis [srv "host"] [srv "port"] 0]
$rr write "*100\r\n"
$rr flush
catch {[$rr read]} e
assert_match {*unauthenticated multibulk length*} $e
$rr close
set rr [redis [srv "host"] [srv "port"] 0]
$rr write "*1\r\n\$100000000\r\n"
$rr flush
catch {[$rr read]} e
assert_match {*unauthenticated bulk length*} $e
$rr close
}
}
+14
View File
@@ -741,3 +741,17 @@ start_server {tags {"scripting repl"}} {
}
}
start_server {tags {"scripting"}} {
test {Test scripting debug protocol parsing} {
r script debug sync
r eval {return 'hello'} 0
catch {r 'hello\0world'} e
assert_match {*Unknown Redis Lua debugger command*} $e
catch {r 'hello\0'} e
assert_match {*Unknown Redis Lua debugger command*} $e
catch {r '\0hello'} e
assert_match {*Unknown Redis Lua debugger command*} $e
catch {r '\0hello\0'} e
assert_match {*Unknown Redis Lua debugger command*} $e
}
}
+156
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
# These tests consume massive amounts of memory, and are not
# suitable to be executed as part of the normal test suite
set ::str500 [string repeat x 500000000] ;# 500mb
# Utility function to write big argument into redis client connection
proc write_big_bulk {size} {
r write "\$$size\r\n"
while {$size >= 500000000} {
r write $::str500
incr size -500000000
}
if {$size > 0} {
r write [string repeat x $size]
}
r write "\r\n"
}
# One XADD with one huge 5GB field
# Expected to fail resulting in an empty stream
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {XADD one huge field} {
r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
r write "*5\r\n\$4\r\nXADD\r\n\$2\r\nS1\r\n\$1\r\n*\r\n"
r write "\$1\r\nA\r\n"
write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
r flush
catch {r read} err
assert_match {*too large*} $err
r xlen S1
} {0}
}
# One XADD with one huge (exactly nearly) 4GB field
# This uncovers the overflow in lpEncodeGetType
# Expected to fail resulting in an empty stream
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {XADD one huge field - 1} {
r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
r write "*5\r\n\$4\r\nXADD\r\n\$2\r\nS1\r\n\$1\r\n*\r\n"
r write "\$1\r\nA\r\n"
write_big_bulk 4294967295 ;#4gb-1
r flush
catch {r read} err
assert_match {*too large*} $err
r xlen S1
} {0}
}
# Gradually add big stream fields using repeated XADD calls
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {several XADD big fields} {
r config set stream-node-max-bytes 0
for {set j 0} {$j<10} {incr j} {
r xadd stream * 1 $::str500 2 $::str500
}
r ping
r xlen stream
} {10}
}
# Add over 4GB to a single stream listpack (one XADD command)
# Expected to fail resulting in an empty stream
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {single XADD big fields} {
r write "*23\r\n\$4\r\nXADD\r\n\$1\r\nS\r\n\$1\r\n*\r\n"
for {set j 0} {$j<10} {incr j} {
r write "\$1\r\n$j\r\n"
write_big_bulk 500000000 ;#500mb
}
r flush
catch {r read} err
assert_match {*too large*} $err
r xlen S
} {0}
}
# Gradually add big hash fields using repeated HSET calls
# This reproduces the overflow in the call to ziplistResize
# Object will be converted to hashtable encoding
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
r config set hash-max-ziplist-value 1000000000 ;#1gb
test {hash with many big fields} {
for {set j 0} {$j<10} {incr j} {
r hset h $j $::str500
}
r object encoding h
} {hashtable}
}
# Add over 4GB to a single hash field (one HSET command)
# Object will be converted to hashtable encoding
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {hash with one huge field} {
catch {r config set hash-max-ziplist-value 10000000000} ;#10gb
r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
r write "*4\r\n\$4\r\nHSET\r\n\$2\r\nH1\r\n"
r write "\$1\r\nA\r\n"
write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
r flush
r read
r object encoding H1
} {hashtable}
}
# Add over 4GB to a single list member (one LPUSH command)
# Currently unsupported, and expected to fail rather than being truncated
# Expected to fail resulting in a non-existing list
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {list with one huge field} {
r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
r write "*3\r\n\$5\r\nLPUSH\r\n\$2\r\nL1\r\n"
write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
r flush
catch {r read} err
assert_match {*too large*} $err
r exists L1
} {0}
}
# SORT which attempts to store an element larger than 4GB into a list.
# Currently unsupported and results in an assertion instead of truncation
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {SORT adds huge field to list} {
r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
r write "*3\r\n\$3\r\nSET\r\n\$2\r\nS1\r\n"
write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
r flush
r read
assert_equal [r strlen S1] 5000000000
r set S2 asdf
r sadd myset 1 2
r mset D1 1 D2 2
catch {r sort myset by D* get S* store mylist}
# assert_equal [count_log_message 0 "crashed by signal"] 0 - not suitable for 6.0
assert_equal [count_log_message 0 "ASSERTION FAILED"] 1
}
}
# SORT which stores an integer encoded element into a list.
# Just for coverage, no news here.
start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
test {SORT adds integer field to list} {
r set S1 asdf
r set S2 123 ;# integer encoded
assert_encoding "int" S2
r sadd myset 1 2
r mset D1 1 D2 2
r sort myset by D* get S* store mylist
r llen mylist
} {2}
}