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47 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
antirez 5116130d42 Redis 3.2.9. 2017-05-17 17:39:00 +02:00
antirez 3b46cf97de redis-cli --bigkeys: show error when TYPE fails.
Close #3993.
2017-05-15 11:23:57 +02:00
antirez f59b4b93d9 Fix preprocessor if/else chain broken in order to fix #3927. 2017-04-21 11:28:02 +02:00
antirez dd80fedf6f Fix zmalloc_get_memory_size() ifdefs to actually use the else branch.
Close #3927.
2017-04-21 11:27:28 +02:00
antirez 697d3abeff Set lua-time-limit default value at safe place.
Otherwise, as it was, it will overwrite whatever the user set.

Close #3703.
2017-04-21 11:26:27 +02:00
antirez c9c04b11b9 Fix #3848 by closing the descriptor on error. 2017-04-21 11:25:08 +02:00
张文康 d3b4992450 update block->free after some diff data are written to the child process 2017-04-20 07:59:46 +02:00
antirez 6a33952b8a Test: fix, hopefully, false PSYNC failure like in issue #2715.
And many other related Github issues... all reporting the same problem.
There was probably just not enough backlog in certain unlucky runs.
I'll ask people that can reporduce if they see now this as fixed as
well.
2017-04-14 17:54:06 +02:00
John.Koepi b83f9fea81 fix #2883, #2857 pipe fds leak when fork() failed on bg aof rw 2017-02-20 10:28:53 +01:00
antirez 10dbb5cd33 Don't leak file descriptor on syncWithMaster().
Close #3804.
2017-02-20 10:28:52 +01:00
antirez db8a945cbb Redis 3.2.8. 2017-02-12 16:14:57 +01:00
antirez 7178cac031 Revert "Jemalloc updated to 4.4.0."
This reverts commit 153f2f00ea.

Jemalloc 4.4.0 is apparently causing deadlocks in certain
systems. See for example https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3799.
As a cautionary step we are reverting the commit back and
releasing a new stable Redis version.
2017-02-12 16:07:13 +01:00
antirez 33fad43c0f Fix MIGRATE closing of cached socket on error.
After investigating issue #3796, it was discovered that MIGRATE
could call migrateCloseSocket() after the original MIGRATE c->argv
was already rewritten as a DEL operation. As a result the host/port
passed to migrateCloseSocket() could be anything, often a NULL pointer
that gets deferenced crashing the server.

Now the socket is closed at an earlier time when there is a socket
error in a later stage where no retry will be performed, before we
rewrite the argument vector. Moreover a check was added so that later,
in the socket_err label, there is no further attempt at closing the
socket if the argument was rewritten.

This fix should resolve the bug reported in #3796.
2017-02-09 10:15:52 +01:00
antirez af12f8ec3c Redis 3.2.7. 2017-01-31 16:32:23 +01:00
antirez 3876d985a8 Ziplist: insertion bug under particular conditions fixed.
Ziplists had a bug that was discovered while investigating a different
issue, resulting in a corrupted ziplist representation, and a likely
segmentation foult and/or data corruption of the last element of the
ziplist, once the ziplist is accessed again.

The bug happens when a specific set of insertions / deletions is
performed so that an entry is encoded to have a "prevlen" field (the
length of the previous entry) of 5 bytes but with a count that could be
encoded in a "prevlen" field of a since byte. This could happen when the
"cascading update" process called by ziplistInsert()/ziplistDelete() in
certain contitious forces the prevlen to be bigger than necessary in
order to avoid too much data moving around.

Once such an entry is generated, inserting a very small entry
immediately before it will result in a resizing of the ziplist for a
count smaller than the current ziplist length (which is a violation,
inserting code expects the ziplist to get bigger actually). So an FF
byte is inserted in a misplaced position. Moreover a realloc() is
performed with a count smaller than the ziplist current length so the
final bytes could be trashed as well.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS:

Currently it looks like an attacker can only crash a Redis server by
providing specifically choosen commands. However a FF byte is written
and there are other memory operations that depend on a wrong count, so
even if it is not immediately apparent how to mount an attack in order
to execute code remotely, it is not impossible at all that this could be
done. Attacks always get better... and we did not spent enough time in
order to think how to exploit this issue, but security researchers
or malicious attackers could.

REPRODUCING:

The bug can be reproduced with the following commands.

    redis-cli del list
    redis-cli rpush list one
    redis-cli rpush list two
    redis-cli rpush list
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    redis-cli rpush list
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    redis-cli rpush list three
    redis-cli rpush list a
    redis-cli lrem list 1
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    redis-cli linsert list after
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    10
    redis-cli lrange list 0 -1

Instead of "rpush list a", use "rpush list 10" in order to trigger a
data corruption instead of a crash.
2017-01-30 16:34:13 +01:00
antirez 153f2f00ea Jemalloc updated to 4.4.0.
The original jemalloc source tree was modified to:

1. Remove the configure error that prevents nested builds.
2. Insert the Redis private Jemalloc API in order to allow the
Redis fragmentation function to work.
2017-01-30 10:11:36 +01:00
miter ca532c94ef Change switch statment to if statment 2017-01-30 10:10:30 +01:00
oranagra a73503530e fix rare assertion in DEBUG DIGEST
getExpire calls dictFind which can do rehashing.
found by calling computeDatasetDigest from serverCron and running the test suite.
2017-01-30 10:10:21 +01:00
Itamar Haber b917e3fdb3 Verify pairs are provided after subcommands
Fixes https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3639
2017-01-30 10:10:14 +01:00
antirez 1177cf6395 Avoid geo.c warning in initialization.
This problem was properly solved in 4.0 / unstable. Here is just a quick
fix for the warning.
2017-01-30 09:16:05 +01:00
antirez 874804da0c Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.

For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
2017-01-30 09:08:58 +01:00
antirez 273cd7ff51 Ziplist: remove static from functions, they prevent good crash reports. 2017-01-27 10:49:53 +01:00
Jan-Erik Rediger 389b9f5945 Initialize help only in repl mode 2017-01-27 10:49:47 +01:00
Yossi Gottlieb 1370a88887 Fix redis-cli rare crash.
This happens if the server (mysteriously) returns an unexpected response
to the COMMAND command.
2016-12-21 11:03:44 +01:00
antirez 68aab8e811 MIGRATE: Remove upfront ttl initialization.
After the fix for #3673 the ttl var is always initialized inside the
loop itself, so the early initialization is not needed.

Variables declaration also moved to a more local scope.
2016-12-14 12:44:32 +01:00
Jan-Erik Rediger 788e892534 Reset the ttl for additional keys
Before, if a previous key had a TTL set but the current one didn't, the
TTL was reused and thus resulted in wrong expirations set.

This behaviour was experienced, when `MigrateDefaultPipeline` in
redis-trib was set to >1

Fixes #3655
2016-12-14 12:41:21 +01:00
antirez 77de5c2b71 Redis 3.2.6. 2016-12-06 09:38:33 +01:00
antirez f20f3ead1b Geo: improve fuzz test.
The test now uses more diverse radius sizes, especially sizes near or
greater the whole earth surface are used, that are known to trigger edge
cases. Moreover the PRNG seeding was probably resulting into the same
sequence tested over and over again, now seeding unsing the current unix
time in milliseconds.

Related to #3631.
2016-12-05 14:19:03 +01:00
antirez 8c22086c34 Geo: fix computation of bounding box.
A bug was reported in the context in issue #3631. The root cause of the
bug was that certain neighbor boxes were zeroed after the "inside the
bounding box or not" check, simply because the bounding box computation
function was wrong.

A few debugging infos where enhanced and moved in other parts of the
code. A check to avoid steps=0 was added, but is unrelated to this
issue and I did not verified it was an actual bug in practice.
2016-12-05 14:18:59 +01:00
antirez 92958df3b1 Cluster: handle zero bytes at the end of nodes.conf. 2016-11-16 14:13:13 +01:00
antirez 0ee28ae40c Test: regression test for #3564 added. 2016-10-31 15:47:09 +01:00
sunhe 289fadb2d0 bitops.c/bitfieldCommand: update higest_write_offset with check 2016-10-31 15:41:40 +01:00
jybaek f4f7d2c37f Add missing fclose() 2016-10-31 15:36:54 +01:00
antirez f61d6f0c4a Redis 3.2.5. 2016-10-26 09:17:45 +02:00
zach shipko 473640790f BSDs don't have -ldl 2016-10-26 09:11:04 +02:00
antirez 9ada818b86 Fix modules compilation when libc malloc is used.
Compiling Redis worked as a side effect of jemalloc target specifying
-ldl as needed linker options, otherwise it is not provided during
linking and dlopen() API will remain unresolved symbols.
2016-10-26 09:11:01 +02:00
antirez 381651fac0 3.2.4 release notes clarifications. 2016-09-26 09:18:59 +02:00
antirez 070d047179 Redis 3.2.4. 2016-09-26 09:10:17 +02:00
antirez 0539634777 Security: CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit overflow fixed.
This commit fixes a vunlerability reported by Cory Duplantis
of Cisco Talos, see TALOS-2016-0206 for reference.

CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit accepts as client class "master"
which is actually only used to implement CLIENT KILL. The "master" class
has ID 3. What happens is that the global structure:

    server.client_obuf_limits[class]

Is accessed with class = 3. However it is a 3 elements array, so writing
the 4th element means to write up to 24 bytes of memory *after* the end
of the array, since the structure is defined as:

    typedef struct clientBufferLimitsConfig {
        unsigned long long hard_limit_bytes;
        unsigned long long soft_limit_bytes;
        time_t soft_limit_seconds;
    } clientBufferLimitsConfig;

EVALUATION OF IMPACT:

Checking what's past the boundaries of the array in the global
'server' structure, we find AOF state fields:

    clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT];
    /* AOF persistence */
    int aof_state;                  /* AOF_(ON|OFF|WAIT_REWRITE) */
    int aof_fsync;                  /* Kind of fsync() policy */
    char *aof_filename;             /* Name of the AOF file */
    int aof_no_fsync_on_rewrite;    /* Don't fsync if a rewrite is in prog. */
    int aof_rewrite_perc;           /* Rewrite AOF if % growth is > M and... */
    off_t aof_rewrite_min_size;     /* the AOF file is at least N bytes. */
    off_t aof_rewrite_base_size;    /* AOF size on latest startup or rewrite. */
    off_t aof_current_size;         /* AOF current size. */

Writing to most of these fields should be harmless and only cause problems in
Redis persistence that should not escalate to security problems.
However unfortunately writing to "aof_filename" could be potentially a
security issue depending on the access pattern.

Searching for "aof.filename" accesses in the source code returns many different
usages of the field, including using it as input for open(), logging to the
Redis log file or syslog, and calling the rename() syscall.

It looks possible that attacks could lead at least to informations
disclosure of the state and data inside Redis. However note that the
attacker must already have access to the server. But, worse than that,
it looks possible that being able to change the AOF filename can be used
to mount more powerful attacks: like overwriting random files with AOF
data (easily a potential security issue as demostrated here:
http://antirez.com/news/96), or even more subtle attacks where the
AOF filename is changed to a path were a malicious AOF file is loaded
in order to exploit other potential issues when the AOF parser is fed
with untrusted input (no known issue known currently).

The fix checks the places where the 'master' class is specifiedf in
order to access configuration data structures, and return an error in
this cases.

WHO IS AT RISK?

The "master" client class was introduced in Redis in Jul 28 2015.
Every Redis instance released past this date is not vulnerable
while all the releases after this date are. Notably:

    Redis 3.0.x is NOT vunlerable.
    Redis 3.2.x IS vulnerable.
    Redis unstable is vulnerable.

In order for the instance to be at risk, at least one of the following
conditions must be true:

    1. The attacker can access Redis remotely and is able to send
       the CONFIG SET command (often banned in managed Redis instances).

    2. The attacker is able to control the "redis.conf" file and
       can wait or trigger a server restart.

The problem was fixed 26th September 2016 in all the releases affected.
2016-09-26 08:56:37 +02:00
antirez c01abcdebf fix the fix for the TCP binding.
This commit attempts to fix a problem with PR #3467.
2016-09-12 10:56:25 +02:00
oranagra a6d0698b22 fix tcp binding when IPv6 is unsupported 2016-09-12 10:56:21 +02:00
antirez 22b6c28d25 debug.c: no need to define _GNU_SOURCE, is defined in fmacros.h. 2016-09-09 11:13:29 +02:00
antirez 9e9d398beb crash log - improve code dump with more info and called symbols. 2016-09-09 11:13:24 +02:00
oranagra 3745c5dc81 crash log - add hex dump of function code 2016-09-09 11:13:21 +02:00
antirez c1cc07b25d Sentinel example config: warn about protected mode. 2016-08-11 19:53:15 +02:00
rojingeorge 011dc9f9a5 Display the nodes summary once the cluster is established using redis-trib.rb
Display the nodes summary once the cluster is established using
redis-trib.rb
After the cluster meet and join was done, when the summary was shown, it
was giving info regarding the nodes. This fix ensures that confusion
where the slaves were shown as masters.
Fix would be to reset the nodes and reload the cluster information
before checking the cluster status after creating it.
2016-08-05 15:11:21 +02:00
Guo Xiao f4e3a940c4 Use the standard predefined identifier __func__ (since C99)
Fix warning: ISO C does not support '__FUNCTION__' predefined identifier
[-Wpedantic]
2016-08-04 10:26:23 +02:00
27 changed files with 600 additions and 94 deletions
+318
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,324 @@ HIGH: There is a critical bug that may affect a subset of users. Upgrade!
CRITICAL: There is a critical bug affecting MOST USERS. Upgrade ASAP.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
================================================================================
Redis 3.2.9 Released Mon May 17 17:35:38 CEST 2017
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency LOW: A few rarely harmful bugs were fixed.
This release just fixes bugs that are unlikely to cause serious problems
so there is no need to update ASAP. Please, see the list of commits
for the details on the bugs fixed and credits:
antirez in commit 3b46cf97:
redis-cli --bigkeys: show error when TYPE fails.
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
antirez in commit f59b4b93:
Fix preprocessor if/else chain broken in order to fix #3927.
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
antirez in commit dd80fedf:
Fix zmalloc_get_memory_size() ifdefs to actually use the else branch.
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
antirez in commit 697d3abe:
Set lua-time-limit default value at safe place.
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
antirez in commit c9c04b11:
Fix #3848 by closing the descriptor on error.
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
张文康 in commit d3b49924:
update block->free after some diff data are written to the child process
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
antirez in commit 6a33952b:
Test: fix, hopefully, false PSYNC failure like in issue #2715.
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
John.Koepi in commit b83f9fea:
fix #2883, #2857 pipe fds leak when fork() failed on bg aof rw
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
antirez in commit 10dbb5cd:
Don't leak file descriptor on syncWithMaster().
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
================================================================================
Redis 3.2.8 Released Sun Feb 12 16:11:18 CET 2017
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency CRITICAL: This release reverts back the Jemalloc upgrade
that is believed to potentially cause a server
deadlock. A MIGRATE crash is also fixed.
Two important bug fixes, the first of one is critical:
1. Apparently Jemalloc 4.4.0 may contain a deadlock under particular
conditions. See https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3799.
We reverted back to the previously used Jemalloc versions and plan
to upgrade Jemalloc again after having more info about the
cause of the bug.
2. MIGRATE could crash the server after a socket error. See for reference:
https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3796.
List of commits:
antirez in commit 7178cac:
Revert "Jemalloc updated to 4.4.0."
150 files changed, 6330 insertions(+), 17245 deletions(-)
antirez in commit 33fad43:
Fix MIGRATE closing of cached socket on error.
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
================================================================================
Redis 3.2.7 Released Tue Jan 31 16:21:41 CET 2017
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency HIGH: This release fixes important security and correctness
issues. It is especially important to upgrade for Redis
Cluster users and for users running Redis in their laptop
since a cross-scripting attack is fixed in this release.
Main bugs fixes and improvements in this release:
1. MIGRATE could incorrectly move keys between Redis Cluster nodes by turning
keys with an expire set into persisting keys. This bug was introduced with
the multiple-keys migration recently. It is now fixed. Only applies to
Redis Cluster users that use the resharding features of Redis Cluster.
2. As Redis 4.0 beta and the unstable branch already did (for some months at
this point), Redis 3.2.7 also aliases the Host: and POST commands to QUIT
avoiding to process the remaining pipeline if there are pending commands.
This is a security protection against a "Cross Scripting" attack, that
usually involves trying to feed Redis with HTTP in order to execute commands.
Example: a developer is running a local copy of Redis for development
purposes. She also runs a web browser in the same computer. The web browser
could send an HTTP request to http://127.0.0.1:6379 in order to access the
Redis instance, since a specially crafted HTTP requesta may also be partially
valid Redis protocol. However if POST and Host: break the connection, this
problem should be avoided. IMPORTANT: It is important to realize that it
is not impossible that another way will be found to talk with a localhost
Redis using a Cross Protocol attack not involving sending POST or Host: so
this is only a layer of protection but not a definitive fix for this class
of issues.
3. A ziplist bug that could cause data corruption, could crash the server and
MAY ALSO HAVE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS was fixed. The bug looks complex to
exploit, but attacks always get worse, never better (cit). The bug is very
very hard to catch in practice, it required manual analysis of the ziplist
code in order to be found. However it is also possible that rarely it
happened in the wild. Upgrading is required if you use LINSERT and other
in-the-middle list manipulation commands.
4. We upgraded to Jemalloc 4.4.0 since the version we used to ship with Redis
was an early 4.0 release of Jemalloc. This version may have several
improvements including the ability to better reclaim/use the memory of
system.
The following is the list of commits:
antirez in commit 3876d98:
Ziplist: insertion bug under particular conditions fixed.
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
antirez in commit 153f2f0:
Jemalloc updated to 4.4.0.
150 files changed, 17271 insertions(+), 6356 deletions(-)
miter in commit ca532c9:
Change switch statment to if statment
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
oranagra in commit a735035:
fix rare assertion in DEBUG DIGEST
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Itamar Haber in commit b917e3f:
Verify pairs are provided after subcommands
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
antirez in commit 1177cf6:
Avoid geo.c warning in initialization.
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
antirez in commit 874804d:
Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
antirez in commit 273cd7f:
Ziplist: remove static from functions, they prevent good crash reports.
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Jan-Erik Rediger in commit 389b9f5:
Initialize help only in repl mode
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Yossi Gottlieb in commit 1370a88:
Fix redis-cli rare crash.
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
antirez in commit 68aab8e:
MIGRATE: Remove upfront ttl initialization.
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Jan-Erik Rediger in commit 788e892:
Reset the ttl for additional keys
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
================================================================================
Redis 3.2.6 Released Tue Dec 06 09:33:29 CET 2016
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency MODERATE: GEORADIUS, BITFIELD and Redis Cluster minor fixes.
This release mainly fixes three bugs:
1. A bug with BITFIELD that may cause the bitmap corruption when setting offsets
larger than the current string size.
2. A GEORADIUS bug that may happen when using very large radius lengths, in
the range of 10000km or alike, due to wrong bounding box calculation.
3. A bug with Redis Cluster which crashes when reading a nodes configuration
file with zero bytes at the end, which sometimes happens with certain ext4
configurations after a system crash.
The following is the list of commits:
antirez in commit f20f3ea:
Geo: improve fuzz test.
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
antirez in commit 8c22086:
Geo: fix computation of bounding box.
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
antirez in commit 92958df:
Cluster: handle zero bytes at the end of nodes.conf.
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
antirez in commit 0ee28ae:
Test: regression test for #3564 added.
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
sunhe in commit 289fadb:
bitops.c/bitfieldCommand: update higest_write_offset with check
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
jybaek in commit f4f7d2c:
Add missing fclose()
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
================================================================================
Redis 3.2.5 Released Wed Oct 26 09:16:40 CEST 2016
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency LOW: This release only fixes a compilation issue due to the
missing -ldl at linking time.
zach shipko in commit 4736407:
BSDs don't have -ldl
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
antirez in commit 9ada818:
Fix modules compilation when libc malloc is used.
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
================================================================================
Redis 3.2.4 Released Mon Sep 26 08:58:21 CEST 2016
================================================================================
Upgrade urgency CRITICAL: Redis 3.2 and unstable contained a security
vulnerability fixed by this release.
Hello Redis Wizards of the Memory Stores Empire,
this is a Redis critical release in order to fix a security issue
which is documented clearly here:
https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/6d9f8e2462fc2c426d48c941edeb78e5df7d2977
Thanks to Cory Duplantis of Cisco Talos for reporting the issue.
IMPACT:
The gist is that using CONFIG SET calls (or by manipulating redis.conf)
an attacker is able to compromise certain fields of the "server" global
structure, including the aof filename pointer, that could be made pointing
to something else. In turn the AOF name is used in different contexts such
as logging, rename(2) and open(2) syscalls, leading to potential problems.
Please note that since having access to CONFIG SET also means to be able
to change the AOF filename (and many other things) directly, this issue
actual real world impact is quite small, so I would not panik: if you
have CONFIG SET level of access, you can do more and more easily.
AFFECTED VERSIONS:
All Redis 3.2.x versions are affected.
OTHER CHANGES IN THIS RELEASE:
This release also includes other things:
* TCP binding bug fixed when only certain addresses were available for
a given port.
* A much better crash report that includes part of the Redis binary:
this will allow to fix bugs even when we just have a crash log and
no other help from the original poster oft the issue.
* A fix for Redis Cluster redis-trib displaying of info after creating
a new cluster.
Please check the following list of commits for credits about who did what.
Thanks to all the contributors and a special thank to Oran Agra for the
help in this release.
List of commits:
antirez in commit 0539634:
Security: CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit overflow fixed.
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
antirez in commit c01abcd:
fix the fix for the TCP binding.
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
oranagra in commit a6d0698:
fix tcp binding when IPv6 is unsupported
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
antirez in commit 22b6c28:
debug.c: no need to define _GNU_SOURCE, is defined in fmacros.h.
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
antirez in commit 9e9d398:
crash log - improve code dump with more info and called symbols.
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
oranagra in commit 3745c5d:
crash log - add hex dump of function code
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
antirez in commit c1cc07b:
Sentinel example config: warn about protected mode.
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
rojingeorge in commit 011dc9f:
Display the nodes summary once the cluster is established using redis-trib.rb
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Guo Xiao in commit f4e3a94:
Use the standard predefined identifier __func__ (since C99)
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
================================================================================
Redis 3.2.3 Released Tue Aug 02 10:55:24 CEST 2016
================================================================================
+9 -26
View File
@@ -80,35 +80,18 @@ uint8_t geohashEstimateStepsByRadius(double range_meters, double lat) {
return step;
}
int geohashBitsComparator(const GeoHashBits *a, const GeoHashBits *b) {
/* If step not equal, compare on step. Else, compare on bits. */
return a->step != b->step ? a->step - b->step : a->bits - b->bits;
}
/* Return the bounding box of the search area centered at latitude,longitude
* having a radius of radius_meter. bounds[0] - bounds[2] is the minimum
* and maxium longitude, while bounds[1] - bounds[3] is the minimum and
* maximum latitude. */
int geohashBoundingBox(double longitude, double latitude, double radius_meters,
double *bounds) {
if (!bounds) return 0;
double lonr, latr;
lonr = deg_rad(longitude);
latr = deg_rad(latitude);
if (radius_meters > EARTH_RADIUS_IN_METERS)
radius_meters = EARTH_RADIUS_IN_METERS;
double distance = radius_meters / EARTH_RADIUS_IN_METERS;
double min_latitude = latr - distance;
double max_latitude = latr + distance;
/* Note: we're being lazy and not accounting for coordinates near poles */
double min_longitude, max_longitude;
double difference_longitude = asin(sin(distance) / cos(latr));
min_longitude = lonr - difference_longitude;
max_longitude = lonr + difference_longitude;
bounds[0] = rad_deg(min_longitude);
bounds[1] = rad_deg(min_latitude);
bounds[2] = rad_deg(max_longitude);
bounds[3] = rad_deg(max_latitude);
bounds[0] = longitude - rad_deg(radius_meters/EARTH_RADIUS_IN_METERS/cos(deg_rad(latitude)));
bounds[2] = longitude + rad_deg(radius_meters/EARTH_RADIUS_IN_METERS/cos(deg_rad(latitude)));
bounds[1] = latitude - rad_deg(radius_meters/EARTH_RADIUS_IN_METERS);
bounds[3] = latitude + rad_deg(radius_meters/EARTH_RADIUS_IN_METERS);
return 1;
}
@@ -161,7 +144,7 @@ GeoHashRadius geohashGetAreasByRadius(double longitude, double latitude, double
< radius_meters) decrease_step = 1;
}
if (decrease_step) {
if (steps > 1 && decrease_step) {
steps--;
geohashEncode(&long_range,&lat_range,longitude,latitude,steps,&hash);
geohashNeighbors(&hash,&neighbors);
+16 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
# Example sentinel.conf
# *** IMPORTANT ***
#
# By default Sentinel will not be reachable from interfaces different than
# localhost, either use the 'bind' directive to bind to a list of network
# interfaces, or disable protected mode with "protected-mode no" by
# adding it to this configuration file.
#
# Before doing that MAKE SURE the instance is protected from the outside
# world via firewalling or other means.
#
# For example you may use one of the following:
#
# bind 127.0.0.1 192.168.1.1
#
# protected-mode no
# port <sentinel-port>
# The port that this sentinel instance will run on
port 26379
@@ -178,4 +194,3 @@ sentinel failover-timeout mymaster 180000
#
# sentinel client-reconfig-script mymaster /var/redis/reconfig.sh
+15 -5
View File
@@ -65,17 +65,27 @@ ifeq ($(uname_S),SunOS)
FINAL_LIBS+= -ldl -lnsl -lsocket -lresolv -lpthread -lrt
else
ifeq ($(uname_S),Darwin)
# Darwin (nothing to do)
# Darwin
FINAL_LIBS+= -ldl
else
ifeq ($(uname_S),AIX)
# AIX
FINAL_LDFLAGS+= -Wl,-bexpall
FINAL_LIBS+= -pthread -lcrypt -lbsd
FINAL_LIBS+=-ldl -pthread -lcrypt -lbsd
else
ifeq ($(uname_S),OpenBSD)
# OpenBSD
FINAL_LIBS+= -lpthread
else
ifeq ($(uname_S),FreeBSD)
# FreeBSD
FINAL_LIBS+= -lpthread
else
# All the other OSes (notably Linux)
FINAL_LDFLAGS+= -rdynamic
FINAL_LIBS+= -pthread
FINAL_LIBS+=-ldl -pthread
endif
endif
endif
endif
endif
@@ -95,7 +105,7 @@ endif
ifeq ($(MALLOC),jemalloc)
DEPENDENCY_TARGETS+= jemalloc
FINAL_CFLAGS+= -DUSE_JEMALLOC -I../deps/jemalloc/include
FINAL_LIBS+= ../deps/jemalloc/lib/libjemalloc.a -ldl
FINAL_LIBS+= ../deps/jemalloc/lib/libjemalloc.a
endif
REDIS_CC=$(QUIET_CC)$(CC) $(FINAL_CFLAGS)
+3 -2
View File
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static int anetV6Only(char *err, int s) {
static int _anetTcpServer(char *err, int port, char *bindaddr, int af, int backlog)
{
int s, rv;
int s = -1, rv;
char _port[6]; /* strlen("65535") */
struct addrinfo hints, *servinfo, *p;
@@ -486,11 +486,12 @@ static int _anetTcpServer(char *err, int port, char *bindaddr, int af, int backl
goto end;
}
if (p == NULL) {
anetSetError(err, "unable to bind socket");
anetSetError(err, "unable to bind socket, errno: %d", errno);
goto error;
}
error:
if (s != -1) close(s);
s = ANET_ERR;
end:
freeaddrinfo(servinfo);
+2
View File
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ void aofChildWriteDiffData(aeEventLoop *el, int fd, void *privdata, int mask) {
if (nwritten <= 0) return;
memmove(block->buf,block->buf+nwritten,block->used-nwritten);
block->used -= nwritten;
block->free += nwritten;
}
if (block->used == 0) listDelNode(server.aof_rewrite_buf_blocks,ln);
}
@@ -1295,6 +1296,7 @@ int rewriteAppendOnlyFileBackground(void) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING,
"Can't rewrite append only file in background: fork: %s",
strerror(errno));
aofClosePipes();
return C_ERR;
}
serverLog(LL_NOTICE,
+3 -2
View File
@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ void bitfieldCommand(client *c) {
struct bitfieldOp *ops = NULL; /* Array of ops to execute at end. */
int owtype = BFOVERFLOW_WRAP; /* Overflow type. */
int readonly = 1;
long higest_write_offset = 0;
size_t higest_write_offset = 0;
for (j = 2; j < c->argc; j++) {
int remargs = c->argc-j-1; /* Remaining args other than current. */
@@ -957,7 +957,8 @@ void bitfieldCommand(client *c) {
if (opcode != BITFIELDOP_GET) {
readonly = 0;
higest_write_offset = bitoffset + bits - 1;
if (higest_write_offset < bitoffset + bits - 1)
higest_write_offset = bitoffset + bits - 1;
/* INCRBY and SET require another argument. */
if (getLongLongFromObjectOrReply(c,c->argv[j+3],&i64,NULL) != C_OK){
zfree(ops);
+27 -10
View File
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int clusterLoadConfig(char *filename) {
/* Skip blank lines, they can be created either by users manually
* editing nodes.conf or by the config writing process if stopped
* before the truncate() call. */
if (line[0] == '\n') continue;
if (line[0] == '\n' || line[0] == '\0') continue;
/* Split the line into arguments for processing. */
argv = sdssplitargs(line,&argc);
@@ -4652,13 +4652,13 @@ void migrateCommand(client *c) {
int copy, replace, j;
long timeout;
long dbid;
long long ttl, expireat;
robj **ov = NULL; /* Objects to migrate. */
robj **kv = NULL; /* Key names. */
robj **newargv = NULL; /* Used to rewrite the command as DEL ... keys ... */
rio cmd, payload;
int may_retry = 1;
int write_error = 0;
int argv_rewritten = 0;
/* To support the KEYS option we need the following additional state. */
int first_key = 3; /* Argument index of the first key. */
@@ -4667,7 +4667,6 @@ void migrateCommand(client *c) {
/* Initialization */
copy = 0;
replace = 0;
ttl = 0;
/* Parse additional options */
for (j = 6; j < c->argc; j++) {
@@ -4743,7 +4742,9 @@ try_again:
/* Create RESTORE payload and generate the protocol to call the command. */
for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) {
expireat = getExpire(c->db,kv[j]);
long long ttl = 0;
long long expireat = getExpire(c->db,kv[j]);
if (expireat != -1) {
ttl = expireat-mstime();
if (ttl < 1) ttl = 1;
@@ -4841,12 +4842,20 @@ try_again:
goto socket_err; /* A retry is guaranteed because of tested conditions.*/
}
/* On socket errors, close the migration socket now that we still have
* the original host/port in the ARGV. Later the original command may be
* rewritten to DEL and will be too later. */
if (socket_error) migrateCloseSocket(c->argv[1],c->argv[2]);
if (!copy) {
/* Translate MIGRATE as DEL for replication/AOF. */
/* Translate MIGRATE as DEL for replication/AOF. Note that we do
* this only for the keys for which we received an acknowledgement
* from the receiving Redis server, by using the del_idx index. */
if (del_idx > 1) {
newargv[0] = createStringObject("DEL",3);
/* Note that the following call takes ownership of newargv. */
replaceClientCommandVector(c,del_idx,newargv);
argv_rewritten = 1;
} else {
/* No key transfer acknowledged, no need to rewrite as DEL. */
zfree(newargv);
@@ -4855,8 +4864,8 @@ try_again:
}
/* If we are here and a socket error happened, we don't want to retry.
* Just signal the problem to the client, but only do it if we don't
* already queued a different error reported by the destination server. */
* Just signal the problem to the client, but only do it if we did not
* already queue a different error reported by the destination server. */
if (!error_from_target && socket_error) {
may_retry = 0;
goto socket_err;
@@ -4864,7 +4873,11 @@ try_again:
if (!error_from_target) {
/* Success! Update the last_dbid in migrateCachedSocket, so that we can
* avoid SELECT the next time if the target DB is the same. Reply +OK. */
* avoid SELECT the next time if the target DB is the same. Reply +OK.
*
* Note: If we reached this point, even if socket_error is true
* still the SELECT command succeeded (otherwise the code jumps to
* socket_err label. */
cs->last_dbid = dbid;
addReply(c,shared.ok);
} else {
@@ -4874,7 +4887,6 @@ try_again:
sdsfree(cmd.io.buffer.ptr);
zfree(ov); zfree(kv); zfree(newargv);
if (socket_error) migrateCloseSocket(c->argv[1],c->argv[2]);
return;
/* On socket errors we try to close the cached socket and try again.
@@ -4884,7 +4896,12 @@ socket_err:
/* Cleanup we want to perform in both the retry and no retry case.
* Note: Closing the migrate socket will also force SELECT next time. */
sdsfree(cmd.io.buffer.ptr);
migrateCloseSocket(c->argv[1],c->argv[2]);
/* If the command was rewritten as DEL and there was a socket error,
* we already closed the socket earlier. While migrateCloseSocket()
* is idempotent, the host/port arguments are now gone, so don't do it
* again. */
if (!argv_rewritten) migrateCloseSocket(c->argv[1],c->argv[2]);
zfree(newargv);
newargv = NULL; /* This will get reallocated on retry. */
+5 -3
View File
@@ -549,8 +549,9 @@ void loadServerConfigFromString(char *config) {
unsigned long long hard, soft;
int soft_seconds;
if (class == -1) {
err = "Unrecognized client limit class";
if (class == -1 || class == CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER) {
err = "Unrecognized client limit class: the user specified "
"an invalid one, or 'master' which has no buffer limits.";
goto loaderr;
}
hard = memtoll(argv[2],NULL);
@@ -834,7 +835,8 @@ void configSetCommand(client *c) {
long val;
if ((j % 4) == 0) {
if (getClientTypeByName(v[j]) == -1) {
int class = getClientTypeByName(v[j]);
if (class == -1 || class == CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER) {
sdsfreesplitres(v,vlen);
goto badfmt;
}
+64 -4
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
#include <ucontext.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include "bio.h"
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#endif /* HAVE_BACKTRACE */
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ void computeDatasetDigest(unsigned char *final) {
redisDb *db = server.db+j;
if (dictSize(db->dict) == 0) continue;
di = dictGetIterator(db->dict);
di = dictGetSafeIterator(db->dict);
/* hash the DB id, so the same dataset moved in a different
* DB will lead to a different digest */
@@ -671,6 +673,8 @@ static void *getMcontextEip(ucontext_t *uc) {
return (void*) uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[16]; /* Linux 64 */
#elif defined(__ia64__) /* Linux IA64 */
return (void*) uc->uc_mcontext.sc_ip;
#elif defined(__arm__) /* Linux ARM */
return (void*) uc->uc_mcontext.arm_pc;
#endif
#else
return NULL;
@@ -972,6 +976,32 @@ int memtest_test_linux_anonymous_maps(void) {
}
#endif
/* Scans the (assumed) x86 code starting at addr, for a max of `len`
* bytes, searching for E8 (callq) opcodes, and dumping the symbols
* and the call offset if they appear to be valid. */
void dumpX86Calls(void *addr, size_t len) {
size_t j;
unsigned char *p = addr;
Dl_info info;
/* Hash table to best-effort avoid printing the same symbol
* multiple times. */
unsigned long ht[256] = {0};
if (len < 5) return;
for (j = 0; j < len-4; j++) {
if (p[j] != 0xE8) continue; /* Not an E8 CALL opcode. */
unsigned long target = (unsigned long)addr+j+5;
target += *((int32_t*)(p+j+1));
if (dladdr((void*)target, &info) != 0 && info.dli_sname != NULL) {
if (ht[target&0xff] != target) {
printf("Function at 0x%lx is %s\n",target,info.dli_sname);
ht[target&0xff] = target;
}
j += 4; /* Skip the 32 bit immediate. */
}
}
}
void sigsegvHandler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *secret) {
ucontext_t *uc = (ucontext_t*) secret;
void *eip = getMcontextEip(uc);
@@ -1022,19 +1052,49 @@ void sigsegvHandler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *secret) {
bioKillThreads();
if (memtest_test_linux_anonymous_maps()) {
serverLogRaw(LL_WARNING|LL_RAW,
"!!! MEMORY ERROR DETECTED! Check your memory ASAP !!!");
"!!! MEMORY ERROR DETECTED! Check your memory ASAP !!!\n");
} else {
serverLogRaw(LL_WARNING|LL_RAW,
"Fast memory test PASSED, however your memory can still be broken. Please run a memory test for several hours if possible.");
"Fast memory test PASSED, however your memory can still be broken. Please run a memory test for several hours if possible.\n");
}
#endif
if (eip != NULL) {
Dl_info info;
if (dladdr(eip, &info) != 0) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING|LL_RAW,
"\n------ DUMPING CODE AROUND EIP ------\n"
"Symbol: %s (base: %p)\n"
"Module: %s (base %p)\n"
"$ xxd -r -p /tmp/dump.hex /tmp/dump.bin\n"
"$ objdump --adjust-vma=%p -D -b binary -m i386:x86-64 /tmp/dump.bin\n"
"------\n",
info.dli_sname, info.dli_saddr, info.dli_fname, info.dli_fbase,
info.dli_saddr);
size_t len = (long)eip - (long)info.dli_saddr;
unsigned long sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
if (len < 1<<13) { /* we don't have functions over 8k (verified) */
/* Find the address of the next page, which is our "safety"
* limit when dumping. Then try to dump just 128 bytes more
* than EIP if there is room, or stop sooner. */
unsigned long next = ((unsigned long)eip + sz) & ~(sz-1);
unsigned long end = (unsigned long)eip + 128;
if (end > next) end = next;
len = end - (unsigned long)info.dli_saddr;
serverLogHexDump(LL_WARNING, "dump of function",
info.dli_saddr ,len);
dumpX86Calls(info.dli_saddr,len);
}
}
}
serverLogRaw(LL_WARNING|LL_RAW,
"\n=== REDIS BUG REPORT END. Make sure to include from START to END. ===\n\n"
" Please report the crash by opening an issue on github:\n\n"
" http://github.com/antirez/redis/issues\n\n"
" Suspect RAM error? Use redis-server --test-memory to verify it.\n\n"
);
/* free(messages); Don't call free() with possibly corrupted memory. */
if (server.daemonize && server.supervised == 0) unlink(server.pidfile);
@@ -1055,7 +1115,7 @@ void serverLogHexDump(int level, char *descr, void *value, size_t len) {
unsigned char *v = value;
char charset[] = "0123456789abcdef";
serverLog(level,"%s (hexdump):", descr);
serverLog(level,"%s (hexdump of %zu bytes):", descr, len);
b = buf;
while(len) {
b[0] = charset[(*v)>>4];
+1 -1
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
#define D(...) \
do { \
FILE *fp = fopen("/tmp/log.txt","a"); \
fprintf(fp,"%s:%s:%d:\t", __FILE__, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__); \
fprintf(fp,"%s:%s:%d:\t", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__); \
fprintf(fp,__VA_ARGS__); \
fprintf(fp,"\n"); \
fclose(fp); \
+24 -1
View File
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ int membersOfGeoHashBox(robj *zobj, GeoHashBits hash, geoArray *ga, double lon,
int membersOfAllNeighbors(robj *zobj, GeoHashRadius n, double lon, double lat, double radius, geoArray *ga) {
GeoHashBits neighbors[9];
unsigned int i, count = 0, last_processed = 0;
int debugmsg = 0;
neighbors[0] = n.hash;
neighbors[1] = n.neighbors.north;
@@ -342,8 +343,26 @@ int membersOfAllNeighbors(robj *zobj, GeoHashRadius n, double lon, double lat, d
/* For each neighbor (*and* our own hashbox), get all the matching
* members and add them to the potential result list. */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(neighbors) / sizeof(*neighbors); i++) {
if (HASHISZERO(neighbors[i]))
if (HASHISZERO(neighbors[i])) {
if (debugmsg) D("neighbors[%d] is zero",i);
continue;
}
/* Debugging info. */
if (debugmsg) {
GeoHashRange long_range, lat_range;
geohashGetCoordRange(&long_range,&lat_range);
GeoHashArea myarea = {{0,0},{0,0},{0,0}};
geohashDecode(long_range, lat_range, neighbors[i], &myarea);
/* Dump center square. */
D("neighbors[%d]:\n",i);
D("area.longitude.min: %f\n", myarea.longitude.min);
D("area.longitude.max: %f\n", myarea.longitude.max);
D("area.latitude.min: %f\n", myarea.latitude.min);
D("area.latitude.max: %f\n", myarea.latitude.max);
D("\n");
}
/* When a huge Radius (in the 5000 km range or more) is used,
* adjacent neighbors can be the same, leading to duplicated
@@ -352,7 +371,11 @@ int membersOfAllNeighbors(robj *zobj, GeoHashRadius n, double lon, double lat, d
if (last_processed &&
neighbors[i].bits == neighbors[last_processed].bits &&
neighbors[i].step == neighbors[last_processed].step)
{
if (debugmsg)
D("Skipping processing of %d, same as previous\n",i);
continue;
}
count += membersOfGeoHashBox(zobj, neighbors[i], ga, lon, lat, radius);
last_processed = i;
}
+24 -2
View File
@@ -1269,8 +1269,10 @@ void processInputBuffer(client *c) {
/* CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY closes the connection once the reply is
* written to the client. Make sure to not let the reply grow after
* this flag has been set (i.e. don't process more commands). */
if (c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY) break;
* this flag has been set (i.e. don't process more commands).
*
* The same applies for clients we want to terminate ASAP. */
if (c->flags & (CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY|CLIENT_CLOSE_ASAP)) break;
/* Determine request type when unknown. */
if (!c->reqtype) {
@@ -1637,6 +1639,26 @@ void clientCommand(client *c) {
}
}
/* This callback is bound to POST and "Host:" command names. Those are not
* really commands, but are used in security attacks in order to talk to
* Redis instances via HTTP, with a technique called "cross protocol scripting"
* which exploits the fact that services like Redis will discard invalid
* HTTP headers and will process what follows.
*
* As a protection against this attack, Redis will terminate the connection
* when a POST or "Host:" header is seen, and will log the event from
* time to time (to avoid creating a DOS as a result of too many logs). */
void securityWarningCommand(client *c) {
static time_t logged_time;
time_t now = time(NULL);
if (labs(now-logged_time) > 60) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Possible SECURITY ATTACK detected. It looks like somebody is sending POST or Host: commands to Redis. This is likely due to an attacker attempting to use Cross Protocol Scripting to compromise your Redis instance. Connection aborted.");
logged_time = now;
}
freeClientAsync(c);
}
/* Rewrite the command vector of the client. All the new objects ref count
* is incremented. The old command vector is freed, and the old objects
* ref count is decremented. */
+2 -4
View File
@@ -241,11 +241,9 @@ void freeStringObject(robj *o) {
}
void freeListObject(robj *o) {
switch (o->encoding) {
case OBJ_ENCODING_QUICKLIST:
if (o->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_QUICKLIST) {
quicklistRelease(o->ptr);
break;
default:
} else {
serverPanic("Unknown list encoding type");
}
}
+17 -7
View File
@@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ static void cliIntegrateHelp(void) {
* don't already match what we have. */
for (size_t j = 0; j < reply->elements; j++) {
redisReply *entry = reply->element[j];
if (entry->type != REDIS_REPLY_ARRAY || entry->elements < 4 ||
entry->element[0]->type != REDIS_REPLY_STRING ||
entry->element[1]->type != REDIS_REPLY_INTEGER ||
entry->element[3]->type != REDIS_REPLY_INTEGER) return;
char *cmdname = entry->element[0]->str;
int i;
@@ -1255,6 +1259,7 @@ void cliLoadPreferences(void) {
if (argc > 0) cliSetPreferences(argv,argc,0);
sdsfreesplitres(argv,argc);
}
fclose(fp);
}
sdsfree(rcfile);
}
@@ -1266,6 +1271,11 @@ static void repl(void) {
int argc;
sds *argv;
/* Initialize the help and, if possible, use the COMMAND command in order
* to retrieve missing entries. */
cliInitHelp();
cliIntegrateHelp();
config.interactive = 1;
linenoiseSetMultiLine(1);
linenoiseSetCompletionCallback(completionCallback);
@@ -2012,8 +2022,13 @@ static void getKeyTypes(redisReply *keys, int *types) {
keys->element[i]->str, context->err, context->errstr);
exit(1);
} else if(reply->type != REDIS_REPLY_STATUS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid reply type (%d) for TYPE on key '%s'!\n",
reply->type, keys->element[i]->str);
if(reply->type == REDIS_REPLY_ERROR) {
fprintf(stderr, "TYPE returned an error: %s\n", reply->str);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Invalid reply type (%d) for TYPE on key '%s'!\n",
reply->type, keys->element[i]->str);
}
exit(1);
}
@@ -2596,11 +2611,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
argc -= firstarg;
argv += firstarg;
/* Initialize the help and, if possible, use the COMMAND command in order
* to retrieve missing entries. */
cliInitHelp();
cliIntegrateHelp();
/* Latency mode */
if (config.latency_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
+5
View File
@@ -1305,6 +1305,11 @@ class RedisTrib
sleep 1
wait_cluster_join
flush_nodes_config # Useful for the replicas
# Reset the node information, so that when the
# final summary is listed in check_cluster about the newly created cluster
# all the nodes would get properly listed as slaves or masters
reset_nodes
load_cluster_info_from_node(argv[0])
check_cluster
end
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ int slaveTryPartialResynchronization(int fd, int read_reply) {
void syncWithMaster(aeEventLoop *el, int fd, void *privdata, int mask) {
char tmpfile[256], *err = NULL;
int dfd, maxtries = 5;
int dfd = -1, maxtries = 5;
int sockerr = 0, psync_result;
socklen_t errlen = sizeof(sockerr);
UNUSED(el);
@@ -1640,6 +1640,7 @@ void syncWithMaster(aeEventLoop *el, int fd, void *privdata, int mask) {
error:
aeDeleteFileEvent(server.el,fd,AE_READABLE|AE_WRITABLE);
if (dfd != -1) close(dfd);
close(fd);
server.repl_transfer_s = -1;
server.repl_state = REPL_STATE_CONNECT;
-1
View File
@@ -900,7 +900,6 @@ void scriptingInit(int setup) {
server.lua_caller = NULL;
server.lua_timedout = 0;
server.lua_always_replicate_commands = 0; /* Only DEBUG can change it.*/
server.lua_time_limit = LUA_SCRIPT_TIME_LIMIT;
ldbInit();
}
+13 -1
View File
@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ struct redisCommand redisCommandTable[] = {
{"pfcount",pfcountCommand,-2,"r",0,NULL,1,-1,1,0,0},
{"pfmerge",pfmergeCommand,-2,"wm",0,NULL,1,-1,1,0,0},
{"pfdebug",pfdebugCommand,-3,"w",0,NULL,0,0,0,0,0},
{"post",securityWarningCommand,-1,"lt",0,NULL,0,0,0,0,0},
{"host:",securityWarningCommand,-1,"lt",0,NULL,0,0,0,0,0},
{"latency",latencyCommand,-2,"aslt",0,NULL,0,0,0,0,0}
};
@@ -1531,6 +1533,7 @@ void initServerConfig(void) {
server.migrate_cached_sockets = dictCreate(&migrateCacheDictType,NULL);
server.next_client_id = 1; /* Client IDs, start from 1 .*/
server.loading_process_events_interval_bytes = (1024*1024*2);
server.lua_time_limit = LUA_SCRIPT_TIME_LIMIT;
server.lruclock = getLRUClock();
resetServerSaveParams();
@@ -1776,6 +1779,7 @@ int listenToPort(int port, int *fds, int *count) {
if (server.bindaddr_count == 0) server.bindaddr[0] = NULL;
for (j = 0; j < server.bindaddr_count || j == 0; j++) {
if (server.bindaddr[j] == NULL) {
int unsupported = 0;
/* Bind * for both IPv6 and IPv4, we enter here only if
* server.bindaddr_count == 0. */
fds[*count] = anetTcp6Server(server.neterr,port,NULL,
@@ -1783,19 +1787,27 @@ int listenToPort(int port, int *fds, int *count) {
if (fds[*count] != ANET_ERR) {
anetNonBlock(NULL,fds[*count]);
(*count)++;
} else if (errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) {
unsupported++;
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Not listening to IPv6: unsupproted");
}
if (*count == 1 || unsupported) {
/* Bind the IPv4 address as well. */
fds[*count] = anetTcpServer(server.neterr,port,NULL,
server.tcp_backlog);
if (fds[*count] != ANET_ERR) {
anetNonBlock(NULL,fds[*count]);
(*count)++;
} else if (errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) {
unsupported++;
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Not listening to IPv4: unsupproted");
}
}
/* Exit the loop if we were able to bind * on IPv4 and IPv6,
* otherwise fds[*count] will be ANET_ERR and we'll print an
* error and return to the caller with an error. */
if (*count == 2) break;
if (*count + unsupported == 2) break;
} else if (strchr(server.bindaddr[j],':')) {
/* Bind IPv6 address. */
fds[*count] = anetTcp6Server(server.neterr,port,server.bindaddr[j],
+1
View File
@@ -1645,6 +1645,7 @@ void pfcountCommand(client *c);
void pfmergeCommand(client *c);
void pfdebugCommand(client *c);
void latencyCommand(client *c);
void securityWarningCommand(client *c);
#if defined(__GNUC__)
void *calloc(size_t count, size_t size) __attribute__ ((deprecated));
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ void zaddGenericCommand(client *c, int flags) {
/* After the options, we expect to have an even number of args, since
* we expect any number of score-element pairs. */
elements = c->argc-scoreidx;
if (elements % 2) {
if (elements % 2 || !elements) {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
return;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
#define REDIS_VERSION "3.2.3"
#define REDIS_VERSION "3.2.9"
+23 -15
View File
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ typedef struct zlentry {
void ziplistRepr(unsigned char *zl);
/* Return bytes needed to store integer encoded by 'encoding' */
static unsigned int zipIntSize(unsigned char encoding) {
unsigned int zipIntSize(unsigned char encoding) {
switch(encoding) {
case ZIP_INT_8B: return 1;
case ZIP_INT_16B: return 2;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static unsigned int zipIntSize(unsigned char encoding) {
/* Encode the length 'rawlen' writing it in 'p'. If p is NULL it just returns
* the amount of bytes required to encode such a length. */
static unsigned int zipEncodeLength(unsigned char *p, unsigned char encoding, unsigned int rawlen) {
unsigned int zipEncodeLength(unsigned char *p, unsigned char encoding, unsigned int rawlen) {
unsigned char len = 1, buf[5];
if (ZIP_IS_STR(encoding)) {
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static unsigned int zipEncodeLength(unsigned char *p, unsigned char encoding, un
/* Encode the length of the previous entry and write it to "p". Return the
* number of bytes needed to encode this length if "p" is NULL. */
static unsigned int zipPrevEncodeLength(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
unsigned int zipPrevEncodeLength(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
if (p == NULL) {
return (len < ZIP_BIGLEN) ? 1 : sizeof(len)+1;
} else {
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ static unsigned int zipPrevEncodeLength(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
/* Encode the length of the previous entry and write it to "p". This only
* uses the larger encoding (required in __ziplistCascadeUpdate). */
static void zipPrevEncodeLengthForceLarge(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
void zipPrevEncodeLengthForceLarge(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
if (p == NULL) return;
p[0] = ZIP_BIGLEN;
memcpy(p+1,&len,sizeof(len));
@@ -309,14 +309,14 @@ static void zipPrevEncodeLengthForceLarge(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
/* Return the difference in number of bytes needed to store the length of the
* previous element 'len', in the entry pointed to by 'p'. */
static int zipPrevLenByteDiff(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
int zipPrevLenByteDiff(unsigned char *p, unsigned int len) {
unsigned int prevlensize;
ZIP_DECODE_PREVLENSIZE(p, prevlensize);
return zipPrevEncodeLength(NULL, len) - prevlensize;
}
/* Return the total number of bytes used by the entry pointed to by 'p'. */
static unsigned int zipRawEntryLength(unsigned char *p) {
unsigned int zipRawEntryLength(unsigned char *p) {
unsigned int prevlensize, encoding, lensize, len;
ZIP_DECODE_PREVLENSIZE(p, prevlensize);
ZIP_DECODE_LENGTH(p + prevlensize, encoding, lensize, len);
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static unsigned int zipRawEntryLength(unsigned char *p) {
/* Check if string pointed to by 'entry' can be encoded as an integer.
* Stores the integer value in 'v' and its encoding in 'encoding'. */
static int zipTryEncoding(unsigned char *entry, unsigned int entrylen, long long *v, unsigned char *encoding) {
int zipTryEncoding(unsigned char *entry, unsigned int entrylen, long long *v, unsigned char *encoding) {
long long value;
if (entrylen >= 32 || entrylen == 0) return 0;
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int zipTryEncoding(unsigned char *entry, unsigned int entrylen, long long
}
/* Store integer 'value' at 'p', encoded as 'encoding' */
static void zipSaveInteger(unsigned char *p, int64_t value, unsigned char encoding) {
void zipSaveInteger(unsigned char *p, int64_t value, unsigned char encoding) {
int16_t i16;
int32_t i32;
int64_t i64;
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static void zipSaveInteger(unsigned char *p, int64_t value, unsigned char encodi
}
/* Read integer encoded as 'encoding' from 'p' */
static int64_t zipLoadInteger(unsigned char *p, unsigned char encoding) {
int64_t zipLoadInteger(unsigned char *p, unsigned char encoding) {
int16_t i16;
int32_t i32;
int64_t i64, ret = 0;
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int64_t zipLoadInteger(unsigned char *p, unsigned char encoding) {
}
/* Return a struct with all information about an entry. */
static void zipEntry(unsigned char *p, zlentry *e) {
void zipEntry(unsigned char *p, zlentry *e) {
ZIP_DECODE_PREVLEN(p, e->prevrawlensize, e->prevrawlen);
ZIP_DECODE_LENGTH(p + e->prevrawlensize, e->encoding, e->lensize, e->len);
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ unsigned char *ziplistNew(void) {
}
/* Resize the ziplist. */
static unsigned char *ziplistResize(unsigned char *zl, unsigned int len) {
unsigned char *ziplistResize(unsigned char *zl, unsigned int len) {
zl = zrealloc(zl,len);
ZIPLIST_BYTES(zl) = intrev32ifbe(len);
zl[len-1] = ZIP_END;
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static unsigned char *ziplistResize(unsigned char *zl, unsigned int len) {
*
* The pointer "p" points to the first entry that does NOT need to be
* updated, i.e. consecutive fields MAY need an update. */
static unsigned char *__ziplistCascadeUpdate(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p) {
unsigned char *__ziplistCascadeUpdate(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p) {
size_t curlen = intrev32ifbe(ZIPLIST_BYTES(zl)), rawlen, rawlensize;
size_t offset, noffset, extra;
unsigned char *np;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static unsigned char *__ziplistCascadeUpdate(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p
}
/* Delete "num" entries, starting at "p". Returns pointer to the ziplist. */
static unsigned char *__ziplistDelete(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p, unsigned int num) {
unsigned char *__ziplistDelete(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p, unsigned int num) {
unsigned int i, totlen, deleted = 0;
size_t offset;
int nextdiff = 0;
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static unsigned char *__ziplistDelete(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p, unsig
}
/* Insert item at "p". */
static unsigned char *__ziplistInsert(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *s, unsigned int slen) {
unsigned char *__ziplistInsert(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *s, unsigned int slen) {
size_t curlen = intrev32ifbe(ZIPLIST_BYTES(zl)), reqlen;
unsigned int prevlensize, prevlen = 0;
size_t offset;
@@ -621,7 +621,12 @@ static unsigned char *__ziplistInsert(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p, unsig
/* When the insert position is not equal to the tail, we need to
* make sure that the next entry can hold this entry's length in
* its prevlen field. */
int forcelarge = 0;
nextdiff = (p[0] != ZIP_END) ? zipPrevLenByteDiff(p,reqlen) : 0;
if (nextdiff == -4 && reqlen < 4) {
nextdiff = 0;
forcelarge = 1;
}
/* Store offset because a realloc may change the address of zl. */
offset = p-zl;
@@ -634,7 +639,10 @@ static unsigned char *__ziplistInsert(unsigned char *zl, unsigned char *p, unsig
memmove(p+reqlen,p-nextdiff,curlen-offset-1+nextdiff);
/* Encode this entry's raw length in the next entry. */
zipPrevEncodeLength(p+reqlen,reqlen);
if (forcelarge)
zipPrevEncodeLengthForceLarge(p+reqlen,reqlen);
else
zipPrevEncodeLength(p+reqlen,reqlen);
/* Update offset for tail */
ZIPLIST_TAIL_OFFSET(zl) =
+3 -2
View File
@@ -413,8 +413,9 @@ size_t zmalloc_get_memory_size(void) {
if (sysctl(mib, 2, &size, &len, NULL, 0) == 0)
return (size_t)size;
return 0L; /* Failed? */
#endif /* sysctl and sysconf variants */
#else
return 0L; /* Unknown method to get the data. */
#endif
#else
return 0L; /* Unknown OS. */
#endif
+1 -1
View File
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ foreach diskless {no yes} {
test_psync {no reconnection, just sync} 6 1000000 3600 0 {
} $diskless 0
test_psync {ok psync} 6 1000000 3600 0 {
test_psync {ok psync} 6 100000000 3600 0 {
assert {[s -1 sync_partial_ok] > 0}
} $diskless 1
+9
View File
@@ -189,4 +189,13 @@ start_server {tags {"bitops"}} {
r set bits 1
r bitfield bits get u1 0
} {0}
test {BITFIELD regression for #3564} {
for {set j 0} {$j < 10} {incr j} {
r del mystring
set res [r BITFIELD mystring SET i8 0 10 SET i8 64 10 INCRBY i8 10 99900]
assert {$res eq {0 0 60}}
}
r del mystring
}
}
+11 -3
View File
@@ -221,18 +221,26 @@ start_server {tags {"geo"}} {
}
test {GEOADD + GEORANGE randomized test} {
set attempt 20
set attempt 30
while {[incr attempt -1]} {
set rv [lindex $regression_vectors $rv_idx]
incr rv_idx
unset -nocomplain debuginfo
set srand_seed [randomInt 1000000]
set srand_seed [clock milliseconds]
if {$rv ne {}} {set srand_seed [lindex $rv 0]}
lappend debuginfo "srand_seed is $srand_seed"
expr {srand($srand_seed)} ; # If you need a reproducible run
r del mypoints
set radius_km [expr {[randomInt 200]+10}]
if {[randomInt 10] == 0} {
# From time to time use very big radiuses
set radius_km [expr {[randomInt 50000]+10}]
} else {
# Normally use a few - ~200km radiuses to stress
# test the code the most in edge cases.
set radius_km [expr {[randomInt 200]+10}]
}
if {$rv ne {}} {set radius_km [lindex $rv 1]}
set radius_m [expr {$radius_km*1000}]
geo_random_point search_lon search_lat